AUGUST 2,
2017
(Part – 1)
“If wishes were horses, beggars would ride!” If wishful
thinking was all that mattered, the poor could have wished away poverty by
merely passing a resolution abolishing global poverty! But can such a wish be
fulfilled as long as resources continue to remain under the control of the
rich? Then how could 122 Non-Nuclear-Weapon-States (NNWS) adopt a treaty to
eliminate nuclear weapons (which they do not possess) without placing the onus
of responsibility on the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) to prohibit use or threat
of use of nuclear weapons until their elimination? Why do these NNWS delude
themselves about nuclear disarmament when they are averse to taking the NWS to
task in this regard?
The ‘Draft
Convention on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons’ was released by the
UN on May 22, 2017 and a detailed critique of the same was published in a
four-part article titled “No More Con Games:
Abolish Nuclear Weapons Now!”. On Jul 07, 2017, at the United Nations,
122 NNWS adopted the “Treaty
on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.”There is substantial
difference between the Draft Text of May 22, 2017 and the Revised Text of Jul
06, 2017 that was adopted on Jul 07, 2017.
Revised Preamble
The
preamble to the Revised Text has been significantly amended. In the
in-depth critique
of the Draft Text (see para between fn. nos. 78 & 79) it was
pointed out that several key aspects, which are essential for reducing the
nuclear threat, had not been included in it. That there were no references to:
* The fact
that nuclear holocaust may result from accident, miscalculation, etc.
* The use
or threat of use of nuclear weapons as constituting a crime against humanity.
* The Right
of Self Defense enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter as not empowering any
member-state to commit genocide; that member-states should only act in a
manner, which is in consonance with Article 2(4) of the UN Charter (to refrain
from threat or use of force against fellow member-states);
* The fact
that nuclear weapons cannot protect life in any way; that its use either
through a preemptive attack or through a retaliatory attack can only cause
widespread death and devastation;
*
Significance of key Resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly on Jan 24,
1946; Dec 20, 1961, etc.
In this
regard, it is gratifying to note that the Revised Text has inserted the
following paras to strengthen the preamble:
* “Mindful
of the risks posed by the continued existence of nuclear weapons, including
from any nuclear-weapon detonation by accident, miscalculation or design, and
emphasizing that these risks concern the security of all humanity, and that all
States share the responsibility to prevent any use of nuclear weapons”;
*
“Considering that any use of nuclear weapons would be contrary to the rules of
international law applicable in armed conflict, in particular the principles
and rules of international humanitarian law”;
*
“Reaffirming that any use of nuclear weapons would also be abhorrent to the
principles of humanity and the dictates of public conscience”;
* “Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State,
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations,
and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security
are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human
and economic resources”;
* “Recalling also the first resolution of the General Assembly of the
United Nations, adopted on 24 January 1946, and subsequent resolutions which
call for the elimination of nuclear weapons”.
These
amendments to the preamble are of course welcome. However, the changes
incorporated in the rest of the Revised Text do not appear to be substantial
enough to rectify all the deficiencies in the Draft Text. This would be
apparent from examining the operational clauses of the Revised Text. In the
in-depth critique
of the Draft Text (in para4), it was noted that the Draft
Text was totally disappointing since it was in no way designed to achieve the
purported objective of prohibiting the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons
that are in the possession of the nuclear weapon states (NWS).
Article – 1
In the
Revised Text, the title of Article – 1 was changed from ‘General obligations’
to ‘Prohibition’. Some modifications were made in the rest of Article – 1 as
well. The Revised Article – 1 states as follows:
“1. Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to:
(a) Develop, test, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess or
stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
(b) Transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices
directly or indirectly;
(c) Receive the transfer of or control over nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices directly or indirectly;
(d) Use or threaten to use nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices;
(e) Assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in
any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty;
(f) Seek or receive any assistance, in any way, from anyone to
engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty;
(g) Allow any stationing,
installation or deployment of any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices in its territory or at any place under its jurisdiction or control.”
As noted
earlier, the call to freeze development, manufacture and stockpiling of nuclear
weapons is, indeed, welcome and, theoretically, it could be applicable to both
Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) as well as Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS).
Unfortunately, the sub-clauses in Article – 1 (never to “Transfer to
any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons” and never to “use or
threaten to use nuclear weapons”), while appearing as positive
ones, are mere window dressing because these provisions even in the Revised
Text are not addressed to the NWS. It is the NWS, which have to give a
categorical undertaking not to use nuclear weapons against NNWS under any circumstances
and not to use it first against fellow NWS. Similarly, only NWS have deployed
nuclear weapons on foreign territories/ international waters and it is their
responsibility to withdraw the same. Of course, the NNWS on whose territory
such nuclear weapons have been deployed should also demand that the same be
withdrawn.
Invisibility of
NWS
As long as
the NNWS do not insist through sustained public pressure that the NWS comply
with the provisions of Article – 1, the NWS are unlikely to unilaterally accede
to this Treaty and take requisite steps to comply with these provisions.
Unfortunately, there are no provisions even in the Revised Text that are
intended to compel the NWS to comply with these provisions or hold the NWS
accountable for the nuclear threat hanging over the world. This benign
non-committal stance of the 122 NNWS fits in well with the philosophy of
abstinence and self purification and it allows the NNWS to turn a blind-eye to
the threat of nuclear holocaust held out by the NWS. This is the biggest
drawback of the propounded ‘Prohibition’ Treaty: the complete failure to
recognize the existence of NWS and to hold them accountable for the impending
nuclear threat facing humanity and the failure to insist that the NWS end their
nuclear blackmail forthwith and take requisite steps to speedily proceed
towards global nuclear disarmament.
Moreover,
while the preamble to the Revised Text recognizes that “prohibition of
nuclear weapons constitutes an important contribution towards the achievement
and maintenance of a world free of nuclear weapons”, there are no
provisions in it that actually seek to outlaw the production and stockpiling of
nuclear weapons. An equally distressing aspect is that, while the
preamble lays emphasis on “the role of public conscience in the
furthering of the principles of humanity as evidenced by the call for the total
elimination of nuclear weapons”, there are no provisions in it that
actually seek to eliminate the existing stockpile of nuclear weapons in a
time-bound manner.
Instead,
what is provided in Article 8 of the Revised Text is as follows: that “further
measures for nuclear disarmament, including: … Measures for the verified,
time-bound and irreversible elimination of nuclear-weapon programmes…” would
be considered at subsequent meetings of State Parties to the Treaty. In short,
the issue of nuclear disarmament is not a part of the present Treaty and the
matter would only be considered at a later date. Therefore, the very title
of the Revised Text, which is “Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons”, is totally misleading since it has nothing to do with prohibiting
the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons that are in the possession of the
NWS until their elimination.
Article –
2
Article – 2
of the Draft Text has been drastically amended by deleting the requisition for
a State Party to declare whether it had acquired “nuclear weapons or
any nuclear explosive devise after 05 December 2001.” Thereby, the
misguided attempt at targeting merely North Korea has been dispensed with. A
significant inclusion is Article – 2(c), which is as follows: “Notwithstanding
Article 1 (g), declare whether there are any nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices in its territory or in any place under its jurisdiction or
control that are owned, possessed or controlled by another State.”
Article – 3
of the Revised Text deals with procedural matters such as safeguards and
requires no comments.
Article – 4
Article – 4
consists of a set of obligations, which are to be fulfilled by those nuclear
weapon states that opt to join the propounded ‘Prohibition’ Treaty after Jul
07, 2017 by agreeing to unilaterally eliminate their nuclear weapons. The
obligations on such NWS include a commitment to “immediately remove
them [nuclear weapons] from operational status”. [Article
4(2)] It is inexplicable as to why the 122 NNWS, i.e., the supporters of the
propounded ‘Prohibition’ Treaty, have not demanded that every NWS should comply
with this obligation to de-alert deployed nuclear weapons immediately. Several
other Nuclear Risk Reduction Measures (NRRMs) should also have been demanded
from the NWS such as:
(a) separate
nuclear warheads from delivery systems;
(b) remove
guidance systems from missiles;
(c) shut
down power to the missiles;
(d) end
the permanent patrol of submarines with SLBMs;
(e) withdraw
all nuclear weapons to national territory (i.e., non-deployment of nuclear
weapons on the territories of NNWS)
(f) stop
training pilots from non-nuclear-weapon states for nuclear missions;
(g) remove
all associated nuclear infrastructures of NWS from the territories of NNWS;
(h) end
the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons; and
(i) reduce
and eliminate tactical nuclear weapons.
Furthermore,
there was no attempt to elicit a commitment from NWS never to use nuclear
weapons against NNWS. It is so unfortunate that there is nothing in the
propounded ‘Prohibition’ Treaty that seeks to reduce the nuclear threat from nuclear
weapons in the possession of the NWS even against the very signatories to the
propounded ‘Prohibition’ Treaty.
Article – 5
is a procedural matter and needs no response.
Articles – 6
Article – 6
is about the responsibility of each State Party to provide assistance to
individual victims of a nuclear holocaust or to those affected by nuclear
weapon tests within the area under their jurisdiction in accordance with
applicable international humanitarian and human rights law. It also places the
onus of responsibility on the State Party for environmental remediation of the
areas so contaminated under its jurisdiction. However, Article – 6 is totally
silent about holding the concerned NWS, which are the only sources from where
such threats against State Parties in the form of nuclear attack or
environmental destruction could emanate, to task. The propounded ‘Prohibition’
Treaty refrains from identifying the source of the nuclear threat. Instead of
proposing action, it feigns ignorance about the source of the problem!
Article – 7
Under
Article – 7, only “a State Party that has used or tested nuclear
weapons or any other nuclear explosive devices shall have a responsibility to
provide adequate assistance to affected States Parties, for the purpose of
victim assistance and environmental remediation.” How could a State
Party, which by definition has ostensibly made a commitment not to use or test
nuclear weapons, use nuclear weapons on other State Parties or test nuclear
weapons that affect areas under the jurisdiction of other State Parties? Only a
NWS, which is a non-State Party to the propounded ‘Prohibition’ Treaty, is
likely to use nuclear weapons on a State Party or test nuclear weapons, which
may also affect an area under the jurisdiction of a State Party. However, there
are no provisions in the propounded ‘Prohibition’ Treaty to act against those
NWS that are not parties to the propounded ‘Prohibition’ Treaty but who have no
compunctions in using nuclear weapons against State Parties to the propounded
‘Prohibition’ Treaty.
Article – 8
As already
noted above, Article – 8 makes it clear that the issue of nuclear
disarmament is not a part of the present Treaty and the matter would only be
considered at a later date at subsequent meetings of the State Parties to the
propounded ‘Prohibition’ Treaty.
Articles –
9, 10 & 11 only deal with procedural matters and need no response.
Article – 12
Article –
12 states that: “Each State Party shall encourage States not
party to this Treaty to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty,
with the goal of universal adherence of all States to the Treaty.” While
the ultimate goal of the propounded “Prohibition’ Treaty is admirable, there is
nothing in the Treaty about possible interim measures to stave off the nuclear threat
posed by NWS against the very signatories to the propounded ‘Prohibition’
Treaty until the NWS agree to eliminate their nuclear weapons. The predicament
is that the propounded ‘Prohibition’ Treaty does not even recognize the
existence of a group of nations possessing nuclear weapons. Therefore, the
propounded ‘Prohibition’ Treaty has made no attempt to impose any set of
obligations on the NWS. When the existence of a problem is not even recognized,
the need to propose a solution does not arise either (a phenomenon that
psychologists describe as ‘solution aversion’)!
Articles –
13 to 17 deal with procedural matters and require no response.
Article – 18
Article –
18 states as follows: “The implementation of this Treaty shall not
prejudice obligations undertaken by States Parties with regard to existing
international agreements, to which they are party, where those obligations are
consistent with the Treaty.” It may be noted that, while the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was given overarching importance in Article – 19
of the Draft Text, in the Revised Text (as stated in Article – 18), it has been
clarified that the “obligations undertaken by States Parties with
regard to existing international agreements” is only to the extent “where
those obligations are consistent with the [‘Prohibition’] Treaty.”
This is a very significant change in stance between the Draft Text of May 22,
2017 and the Revised Text of Jul 06, 2017, which was adopted by 122 NNWS on Jul
07, 2017.
The Draft
Text was completely subservient to the NPT with its Article – 19 stating as
follows: “This Convention does not affect the rights and obligations of
the State Parties under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons.” However, in the Revised Text, the reference to NPT has
been obliterated from Article 18. Although it has lost its centrality in the
Revised Text, reference to the NPT (as well as, CTBT and NWFZs) has been
modified and retained in the preamble as follows:
*
“Reaffirming also that the full and effective implementation of the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons[NPT], which serves as the cornerstone
of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, has a vital role to
play in promoting international peace and security”;
*
“Recognizing the vital importance of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty [CTBT] and its verification regime as a core element of the
nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime”;
*
“Reaffirming the conviction that the establishment of the internationally
recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones [NWFZs] on the basis of
arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned
enhances global and regional peace and security, strengthens the nuclear
non-proliferation regime and contributes towards realizing the objective of
nuclear disarmament.”
Unlike the
Draft Text, the Revised Text’s position on the NPT is contradictory.
[To be
continued]
More
articles by:N.D.
JAYAPRAKASH
N.D. Jayaprakash is
Joint Secretary, Delhi Science Forum and Co-Convenor, Bhopal
Gas Peedith Sangharsh Sahayog Samiti (Coalition for supporting the
Cause of the Bhopal Gas Victims).
No comments:
Post a Comment