THE GLOBAL BLUEPRINT FOR NEO-OTTOMANISM: ENERGY AND MILITARY: PART II
Source: Pixabay
02.03.2017
Issues of regional
geo-economy
Energy Imperatives
Concept:
Turkey, especially under Erdogan, is striving to achieve maximum
flexibility in its foreign policy dealings, but this is impossible to do unless
it can attain reliable and secure access to energy. Truth be told, Turkey
already has this with Russia so it doesn’t need to look any further to attain
this, but what the Neo-Ottomans want is to one day diversify their supplies
from Russia to the point where Moscow’s energy connection with Ankara is
completely depoliticized and absolutely incapable of influencing the de-facto
Caliph. This push for full strategic sovereignty is very much like what China
is currently doing through its management of multiple energy suppliers all
across the world in order to avoid a dependence on any single one. For example,
the People’s Republic counts its main energy partners as being Russia,
Turkmenistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Angola, and there’s nothing stopping
Turkey from doing something similar, albeit with some different
suppliers.
The Russian Projects:
Turkey is very comfortable
with its reliable and secure energy access from Russia, as manifested by the
current Blue Stream and future Balkan/Turkish Stream projects, and any
diversification away from its present and medium-term dependence on Russian
supplies shouldn’t necessarily be seen as a hostile act against Moscow, let
alone one which puts either of those two initiatives in jeopardy. Turkey needs
the Balkan/Turkish Stream for geostrategic reasons just as much as Russia does,
since this creates the structural platform for Moscow and Ankara’s
collaboration in solving the three most pressing
Balkan problems – Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia. Each of these
potential (continuation) conflicts are interconnected to a large strategic
degree owing to the nature of Balkan geopolitics, the demographics involved,
and the influence of traditional Great Powers such as Russia, Turkey, and
Germany, to say nothing of the interfering role that the US has recently begun
to play in this region since the end of the Old Cold War. The deteriorating
relations between Turkey and Germany give Russia an opportunity to replace
Berlin as Ankara’s partner in the Balkans and herald in a new era of
cooperative relations that would seek to resolve the three previously mentioned
trigger points which also endanger the viability of their Balkan/Turkish Stream
joint project.
In a nutshell, Balkan/Turkish Stream was agreed to by Turkey not just as
a means of securing reliable access to energy, but as a way to deepen its
strategic partnership with Russia and hopefully move it in the direction of
Balkan cooperation.
This is why the project will remain important to Erdogan and whoever may
eventually succeed him because it moves beyond the pragmatic purpose of
satisfying Turkey’s energy needs by also giving the country the chance to
promote the soft and political power of Neo-Ottomanism, though not necessarily
in a manner which obstructs Russia’s regional interests. Therefore, Balkan/Turkish
Stream will remain influential even if the Neo-Ottoman state succeeds in
diversifying its energy partners away from Russia and lessening the leverage
which Moscow is theoretically capable of exerting on Ankara due to its
dependence on the former’s resources. However, it should be forewarned that
Turkey’s efforts to achieve maximum strategic flexibility through energy
diversification could also backfire by emboldening its leadership to possibly
take geopolitical positions in the Balkans and Mideast which are contrary to
Russia’s out of the knowledge that Moscow would be less effective at possibly
wielding the energy card as it could have done before.
The Near Abroad:
Turkey’s “Near Abroad”, or in other words, the countries within close
proximity to its borders, provides for Ankara’s ideal solution in lessening its
dependence on Russian resources, and it’s already pursing these opportunities
to a large extent. The map below outlines the current and forecasted pipelines
which involve Turkey to some degree or another, followed by brief explanations
of each one and their overall significance:
Light Blue – Blue Stream
(existing) and Balkan/Turkish Stream (in progress)
These projects were already described, and the hashed lines indicate the
two paths that Balkan/Turkish Stream could take in supplying the regional and
larger European market. These are essentially a revival of the South Stream
project through Bulgaria and then on towards Serbia and deeper into Europe, or
a circuitous detour through Greece and then the Republic of Macedonia before
reaching Serbia.
Red – BTC Pipeline
This existing pipeline connects Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey, and is
also used to supply “Israel”. It forms the ‘spine’ of most of the planned or
forecasted routes which run through Turkey and was proof of the concept that
the country could serve as an energy bridge between various players.
Green – TANAP/TAP (in
progress)
The Trans-Anatolian Pipeline is currently being built, and it plans to
transform into the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline by crossing that sea and eventually
connecting Italy with Azerbaijan by means of Georgia, Turkey, Greece, and
Albania. This project, and any related non-Russian one in this part of the
world, is referred to as being part of the EU’s so-called “Southern
Corridor”.
Dark Blue – Kirkuk-Ceyhan
Pipeline
This Iraq-Turkey pipeline passes through the Kurdish Regional Government
and has the potential for further expansion and use. It doesn’t just have to
stop at Ceyhan, and could conceivably be expanded to connect to TANAP and
thenceforth directly to the EU market through either Italy or the Nabucco
Pipeline.
Grey – Nabucco Pipeline
This long-discussed route would in theory link Turkey with the EU by
means of the bloc’s Balkan states of Bulgaria and Romania. It largely fell out
of discussion after Russia unveiled South Stream and seamlessly replaced it
with Balkan/Turkish Stream, but it still remains a possibility, especially if
enough energy from Azerbaijan, Iraq (including the Kurdish Regional
Government), Iran, and/or possibly even Turkmenistan and Qatar becomes
available.
Brown – Iran-Turkey Pipeline
The changing geopolitical
conditions of renewed US-Iranian tensions make this route less likely than it
was before, but even so, it deserves to be spoken about at least briefly. Iran
could potentially connect its Persian Gulf energy supplies to either TANAP by
means of Southeastern Turkey (“Turkish Kurdistan”) or indirectly through
Azerbaijan and then Georgia. The first route is much more economically
feasible, but runs the high risk of being targeted by the PKK, hence the
possible need to detour through Azerbaijan and Georgia, or maybe even Armenia and Georgia in reaching the Black
Sea, Romania, and the rest of the EU.
Orange – Turkmenistan
Interconnection
The Central Asian Republic has copious amounts of gas, and it’s always
been one of the EU’s dreams to find a way to tap into it. Two possibilities
exist; an undersea pipeline to Azerbaijan and TANAP, or an overland one through
Iran. Both ideas seem unlikely to reach fruition anytime soon owing to the
unresolved territorial settlement over the Caspian Sea and increasing
US-Iranian tensions, respectively, but regardless, these possibilities
shouldn’t be completely forgotten about and opportunities might arise in the
future for their fulfillment.
Pink – Qatar-Turkey Pipeline
This route was one of the reasons behind the War on Syria, as President
Assad didn’t agree to it and opted instead for the Friendship Pipeline between
Iran, Iraq, and Syria. In the event that he’s removed through a phased regime
change in accordance with whatever conflict resolution settlement might be
agreed to, or if Syria is “federalized” (internally partitioned), then there’s
a very real chance that this project could receive a second breath of life and
be built through “Sunnistan”. Just like the prospective Iran-Turkey pipeline,
the idea is to eventually link it up with TANAP and then Nabucco in order to
supply the EU.
Lavender – Arab Gas Pipeline
There’s already a little-known pipeline bringing together Egypt, Jordan,
and Syria, and the possibility theoretically exists for it to be expanded to
Turkey too, but the War on Syria and Cairo’s post-Muslim Brotherhood problems
with Ankara have precluded this from happening for the time being. If President
Assad is removed and Egypt and Turkey reconcile, then this project might become
viable and contribute additional energy supplies to Turkey, as well as
potentially feed into Nabucco.
Black – Eastern
Mediterranean Pipeline
The last examined project
which Turkey has its sights set on is the large-scale one which has been proposed for linking “Israel’s”
Leviathan offshore gas fields with Cyprus’ nearby Aphrodite one via an
underwater pipeline that would eventually terminate in Greece, possibly with
the chance of joining TAP to supply the southern EU. It also can’t be precluded
that this project would connect with the proposed Ionian-Adriatic Pipeline
between Greece, Albania, Montenegro, Bosnia, and Croatia in sending energy to
Central Europe. In order for Turkey to have a stake in this project, it needs
to succeed in pressuring Nicosia to agree to the federalization of Cyprus and therefore allowing
the northern Turkish-controlled part to indirectly enable Ankara’s
involvement.
Light Green –
Ionian-Adriatic Pipeline
Referred to above, this prospective pipeline would either serve as a
branch of TANAP or the other half of the Eastern Mediterranean Pipeline.
Distant Finds:
Other than the many energy connectivity possibilities which exist in
Turkey’s Near Abroad, there are also three other suppliers which have yet to be
discussed, and these are Libya, Tanzania, and Mozambique.
Libya
The North African state is
mired in an intense state of civil war after the pro-Turkish Muslim Brotherhood
“rebels” were unsuccessful in cementing their power following the overthrow and
murder of former Libyan leader Gaddafi. There doesn’t seem to be much hope that
Turkey can restore what it had assumed would have been its premier position in
the country after the “Arab Spring” events, even though there have been reports
that it’s still trying to do so through low-scale support given to various
militias. Even in the case that Ankara can recover some of its strategic losses
in the post-Gaddafi country, it wouldn’t be with the intent of building a
pipeline of any sorts, but rather through controlling some of Libya’s energy
exports to Europe via its companies. However, this is looking increasingly
unlikely as Western and Russian companies are racing
to fill the void in preparing their business plans for whenever the country
eventually stabilizes
Tanzania and Mozambique
These two gas-rich countries
have yet to become major global players on the energy marketplace, but their
offshore deposits are impressive enough that they’re expected to reach this
enviable position sometime in the future. Just like with Libya, Turkey harbors
no desire to build a pipeline from either Tanzania or Mozambique to its own shores (nor
is such an idea economically feasible), but wants to simply secure reliable
access to the energy that’s expected to be exported from here in the next
decade. This forward-thinking planning was one of the reasons why Erdogan visited these two countries in
January, and it’s expected that the relationship between all three parties is
only expected to grow in the future. Keeping in mind that other Great Powers
are racing to tap into these resources too, it’s a prudent move for Turkey to
try to get in first and possibly play the ‘caliphate card’ in appealing to
Tanzania’s majority-Muslim population and minority believers in
Mozambique.
Military Maneuvering
Part I mentioned that there’s an almost perfect overlap between Turkey’s
Neo-Ottoman soft power, geopolitical, energy, and military interests, so it’s
now appropriate to explain the latter element of Erdogan’s global blueprint and
prove how it closely corresponds with everything that’s been expostulated upon
to this point. The most coherent way to do illustrate the undeniably visible
pattern at play is to go through the previous list of energy interests and
highlight the influence that Turkey’s military is playing on each of these
actual, ongoing, and prospective projects. For comparison’s sake, here’s the map
once more, and it will be followed by the exact same descriptive format for
outlining each endeavor and then explaining how the relevant involvement of
Turkey’s military is conditioned on achieving Erdogan’s grand Neo-Ottoman
objectives of positioning his country into a strategic superpower:
Light Blue – Blue Stream
(existing) and Balkan/Turkish Stream (in progress):
Turkey didn’t have to use any military means to secure either of these
projects, but Russian-Turkish military coordination in Syria and pertinent
conflict resolution diplomacy in Astana have strengthened the bilateral
relationship and confirmed the broader strategic wisdom behind agreeing to both
of them.
Red – BTC Pipeline:
Turkey has fraternal
relations with Azerbaijan and has been blockading its rival Armenia – whom
Turkey also has issues with concerning the post-World War I genocide – and has
been supplying Baku with military hardware and advisors ever since the
country’s independence. Ankara is also a strong proponent of Georgia’s NATO
membership, not so much as a means of irritating Russia, but as a way to
advance Turkey’s influence over the Caucasian country and pair the energy
relationship with a military one in recreating a regional sphere of influence
in the transcontinental border space.
Green – TANAP/TAP (in
progress):
Relations are horrible right
now between Turkey and Greece, though they’re very good between Albania and
Turkey. Whether or not it’s connected, ties between Tirana and Athens – never close by any means – have
gotten slightly worse around the same time
as those between Ankara and Athens have, though for different reasons, albeit
both related to territorial disputes. Greece, however, isn’t recognized by any
serious experts at this time as exhibiting the behavior of a sovereign and
independent state, so it’s possible that its EU overseers might force it to
remain on good enough terms with both of its Neo-Ottoman neighbors in order to
not jeopardize the prospects for the many “Southern Corridor” projects which
are anticipated to run through its territory.
Dark Blue – Kirkuk-Ceyhan
Pipeline:
Turkey is very close to the
Kurdish Regional Government of Masoud Barzani, who despite being a Kurd, bucks
the Mainstream Media stereotype by enjoying high-level strategic relations with
Erdogan. In fact, relations between both actors are of such an important level
that Barzani ‘invited’ Turkish troops into the
areas of Northern Iraq that he controls in order to train the Peshmerga and
defend against any of Daesh’s possible offensives further north.
This sparked a major diplomatic incident in December 2015, but looking
past the problems that it caused for Ankara and Baghdad, it ironically showcased
just how close Erbil and Ankara are, contrary to popular thought.
As it pertains to the examined pipeline politics at play for
Neo-Ottomanism, this proves that Turkey is willing to dispatch military forces
to protect the Kirkuk-Ceyhan route and would also likely be favorable – or at
the least, not outright opposed – to “Kurdish independence” in Northern Iraq,
so long as Barzani and his Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) remained in charge
and the resources kept flowing through Turkey en route to the global
marketplace.
Grey – Nabucco Pipeline:
Turkey hasn’t utilized its military to promote this proposed project
because it simply sees no need to. That, however, doesn’t mean that Turkish
military deployments elsewhere aren’t related to this pipeline, since Ankara’s
moves in Northern Iraq and Southeastern Turkey (“Turkish Kurdistan”) are
directly connected with potentially securing these routes for future use and
thereby enabling their eventual linkage with Nabucco one day.
Brown – Iran-Turkey
Pipeline:
As was just mentioned above,
Turkey’s military operations in its southeastern corner of the country
(“Turkish Kurdistan”) are partially meant to destroy the PKK terrorist
insurgency with the intent of facilitating a possible Iran-Turkey pipeline
which could eventually feed Europe through Nabucco. It should be noted,
however, that amidst the recurrence of traditional
Turkish-Iranian suspicions (in spite of the Tripartite between them and
Russia over Syria) and rising US-Iranian tensions, this pipeline seems ever
less likely to be built anytime in the future, and that Turkey’s military
actions in the southeast are mostly for the sake of national unity and to
promote a possible forthcoming federal solution which would help propel the
administrative-political expansion of Neo-Ottomanism with time.
Orange – Turkmenistan
Interconnection:
There is nothing that Turkey can do militarily to improve the chance that
this project is ever actualized , but its alliance with Azerbaijan and anti-PKK
efforts in the southeast of its own territory help to secure it in the
unlikely event that it’s ever constructed.
Pink – Qatar-Turkey
Pipeline:
President Assad’s choice to decline participation in this project is
perhaps one of the main triggers for the War on Syria, and it’s why Turkey has
expended such time, energy, and resources towards trying to topple him. It also
explains why Turkey both actively and passively assisted terrorist groups
involved in this campaign, whether through arming them directly or turning a
blind eye through their transit across its territory.
Operation Euphrates Shield has as one of its
unstated objectives the creation of a pro-Turkish sphere of
influence in the north which could eventually be expanded to include all of
“Syrian Kurdistan” (should a KDP-like pro-Turkish party be successfully
installed there) and the southern desert regions of “Sunnistan” (including
potentially those in western Iraq as well).
Moreover, Turkey opened up a military base in
Qatar last year, which presently serves the function of deepening the Muslim
Brotherhood bonds between the two countries and also supervising part of the
maritime route through which Qatari resources will travel on the way to Turkey,
which will likely see much use in the coming future seeing as how the chances
for a Qatar-Turkey pipeline are plummeting unless Syria can be coerced into
agreeing to de-facto “federalization” to facilitate it.
Lavender – Arab Gas
Pipeline:
The prospects for this pipeline are fully connected with whether or not
President Assad is deposed and if Cairo and Ankara enter into a rapprochement.
Ties between Egypt and Turkey have been strained ever since President Sisi
overthrew pro-Turkish Muslim Brotherhood leader Mohamed Morsi in 2013, and
they’ve struggled to return back to their prior level ever since then. Even so,
there’s nothing in principle which precludes Egypt and Turkey from cooperating
on the Eastern Mediterranean Pipeline since they both also ‘recognize’
“Israel”.
Black – Eastern
Mediterranean Pipeline:
One of the most ambitious energy projects in the future stands to be the
Eastern Mediterranean Pipeline, and it’s probably one of the reasons why Turkey
decided to publicly reconcile with “Israel” after the 2010 Gaza flotilla
incident. Turkey doesn’t directly have any stake in this initiative, but it
does have a chance to get involved via its client ‘state’ of Northern Cyprus,
specifically if this entity enters into a federal arrangement with the rest of
Cyprus which could give it and its decision makers access to the offshore
Aphrodite deposit.
This in turn would essentially give Turkey a channel through which it
could also profit from this project, but more importantly, become a strategic
overseer over a crucial transit section of it (via a federalized settlement to
the Cyprus conflict and the North’s corresponding influence on the united
entity’s economic policy), thereby propelling Turkish influence to even higher
levels than previously thought possible. Ankara would then be able to have yet
another form of leverage over Athens which could complement TANAP and possibly
lead to Greek concessions in the Aegean Islands dispute sometime in the
future.
Libya:
Turkey lost almost all of
the influence that it thought it had gained following the overthrow and killing
of Gaddafi after Libya slid into a multisided civil war, and Ankara has yet to
claw back even a fraction of it despite its reported assistance to some of the armed
groups (Neo-Ottoman proxies) there. Erdogan triumphantly strutted across the three
post-“Arab Spring” North African states of Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia at the end
of 2011, but in the years since, Turkey’s influence has considerably diminished
over each one of them, except perhaps strategically irrelevant (in this specific
context) Tunisia.
The US’ hopes for achieving a transregional Muslim Brotherhood series of
pro-Turkish satellite states failed miserably after the Syrian people refused
to surrender and Libya consequently slid into civil war. The 2013 Egyptian coup
spelled the final end of this geopolitical project, at least in its originally
intended iteration, though it might receive a late boost of sorts if aging
Algerian President Bouteflika passes away and a second Islamist Civil War
breaks out in the sprawling North African country.
However, even in such a case, the close proximity to Europe and very high
likelihood of uncontrollable immigration flows portends a rapid reaction
intervention by the Western Great Powers (led by France) in order to stem the
predictable chaos, which would probably work against Turkish Neo-Ottoman
strategic interests. Correspondingly, the resolution of the Libyan Civil War
probably won’t be to Turkey’s benefit since Western and even Russian companies
are poised to gain influence over the country’s energy exports and squeeze out
Turkey.
Tanzania and Mozambique:
The North African obstacles
interfering with Turkey’s Neo-Ottoman global blueprint aren’t present in
Southeast Africa, though, which is why this region of the world is so promising
for Ankara when it comes to securing reliable energy access. Erdogan and his
team seem to have already realized this, which might be why Turkey is opening up a military base in
the Somali capital of Mogadishu. This isn’t just to fight against Al Shabaab
like the press releases make it sound, but to also eventually exercise
influence along the north-south maritime route which will become ever more
important as Turkey seeks to diversify its dependence on Russian resources by
becoming a larger purchaser of Tanzania and Mozambique’s.
On a broader level,
Sub-Saharan African offers enormous market and agricultural potential for
Turkey, and Ankara’s diplomatic offensive of the past years in
opening more embassies and consulates all across the continent, as well as
Turkey’s improved flight connectivity to dozens of cities, improves the odds
that this will reap profitable future dividends. There’s also the fact that
nearly a quarter of all the world’s Muslims live in Africa, where they
constitute nearly half of the population, which plays into Turkey’s Neo-Ottoman
Caliphate narrative by improving the soft power image that it has in eyes of
some co-confessionals. Taken even further, it’s possible that Turkey’s military
inroads with Somalia and its strategic ones with Tanzania and Mozambique might
serve as springboards for further Great Power expansion deeper into the
continent.
(Continued in Part III).
______
All personal views are my
own and do not necessarily coincide with the positions of my employer (Sputnik
News) or partners unless explicitly and unambiguously stated otherwise by them.
I write in a private capacity unrepresentative of anything and anyone except
for my own personal views. Nothing written by me should ever be conflated with
Sputnik or the Russian government's official position on any issue.
No comments:
Post a Comment