A Free Syrian Army fighter carries a baby, the only survivor in his family after an artillery round destroyed his home in Aleppo. (photo: Sipa USA/Rex Features)
4 Essential Questions Before We Rush to War
04 September 13
Before deciding how the U.S. should address the human atrocity in Syria, here are the moral questions at stake
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Thursday, I was asked to appear on CNN to discuss the burgeoning
humanitarian crisis in Syria. Truth be told, I almost said no to the
invitation - and for a bad reason. While I do not believe there is
evidence to suggest an attack on Syria will make anything better, I felt
somewhat conflicted about what I thought the United States should
specifically do in the wake of a chemical attack in that country. I
reflexively assumed that such ambivalence disqualifies anyone from
expressing any opinion, especially in a cable TV realm that often seeks
to portray every debate as a battle between crystal-clear absolutisms.
But, of course, in this kind of situation, there
really is only one absolute truth: What's happening in Syria is a human
rights atrocity. Almost everything else, and especially the proper
course of action, is all opinion, some of it at least fact-based,
measured and informed, but much of it purely ideological. And pretending
otherwise - pretending that there is one indisputably correct,
pro-intervention path forward - is the most ideological position of all.
In fact, such absolutism is beyond mere ideology - it is theology.
Ultimately, I accepted CNN's invitation, and the process of pondering four questions helped prepare me for that discussion. These questions do not focus on the very legitimate concerns about the financial expense
and risk to U.S. troops that are involved in an attack on Syria.
Instead, they focus on the moral questions about the whole concept of
humanitarian military intervention. Considering them clarified some
things for me. Perhaps they will for you too as you watch today's Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing about a possible attack on Syria. Here they are:
1. Is it natural to feel conflicted about a
response to the Syrian civil war? Was it natural to initially feel
conflicted about the Iraq War?
I opposed the Iraq War from the beginning, but I would
be lying if I said that in my heart at the time I didn't feel some
ambivalence. Not only were U.S. government officials claiming that
Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden were conspiring to launch a coordinated assault to incinerate American cities with nuclear weapons,
but Saddam's thuggery had created an ongoing human rights atrocity in
his country. Quite naturally, those factors combined to create a sense
of urgency - a sense of "do something, anything!" - among those who at
once didn't want to be incinerated and wanted to halt undue suffering at
the hands of a dictator.
This time around - thankfully - nobody is pretending the Assad regime represents an imminent threat to the United States
(though don't be surprised if that drumbeat soon commences). But the
human rights atrocities in Syria are real, and should be offensive and
horrifying to anyone with a pulse. So the "do something, anything!"
impulse isn't "liberal" or "conservative." And it isn't silly, stupid or
war-mongering. It is simply a sign that you are human.
What can be silly, stupid and war-mongering is to
assume that the "do something, anything!" impulse is proof that one
course of action - a military attack - is the only proper or humane
thing to do.
2. The rational question to ask is: Will an action actually make the situation better?
In the last few days, we have been told by the U.S. government and pro-war voices in the Washington punditburo
that opposing a military assault on Syria is akin to appeasing Adolf
Hitler and the Nazis. Not only does such an argument instantly discredit
itself by violating Godwin's Law,
it smacks of previously discredited rhetoric - the kind that aims to
distract attention from what should be the most important questions of
all.
As we all remember, the meager debate over the Iraq
War (if you can even call it a debate) was an exercise in the ugliest
kind of reductionism: the "with us or with the terrorists"
kind. Support the war, and you were encouraged to feel like a brave,
patriotic, red-blooded hater of Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden, and
you could proudly slap an American flag on your SUV bumper and
congratulate yourself for being an honorable supporter of the troops.
Oppose the war, by contrast, and you were were cast as a supporter of
Saddam and al-Qaida and you were often vilified as an ungrateful traitor
daring to undermine brave U.S. soldiers protecting your freedom.
This, no doubt, is the propaganda of Permanent War,
for it deliberately obscures what the real question should be when it
comes to military action, especially the kind publicly predicated on
humanitarian concerns. The question is not whether you love or hate a
particular dictator, because if that was the question, then the U.S.
government has a lot to answer for in its alliances with many dictators.
No, the question when it comes to wars of choice ostensibly waged in
defense of human rights should be far more straightforward: namely, will
military action result in a net increase or decrease in human
suffering?
Many of us who opposed the Iraq War did so not out of
some affinity for Saddam Hussein, but because we believed there was a
good chance that an invasion would ultimately increase human suffering.
Some who supported the war did so because they believed the opposite.
But many who supported the war did so without even the slightest regard
for those considerations. That included the Bush administration, as
evidenced by its "bring 'em on" bravado and its utter lack of regard for postwar planning.
Thanks, in part, to that administration's cavalier attitude, up to 1 million Iraqi civilians died.
Iraq War supporters would have us believe that simply because Saddam is
dead and gone, none of that matters, but it's possible (if not likely)
the families of the million dead disagree. It's also possible that while
Syria is not Iraq, we can learn from the Iraq experience that "with us
or with the terrorists" sloganeering can, unto itself, be a devious
rationale for other kinds of atrocities - the ones we perversely commit
in the official name of human rights.
With all that in mind, the question of U.S. military
action against Syria becomes far more thorny because it is not at all
clear that military action will make anything better - and that's
putting it mildly. As McClatchy
notes, military and geopolitical experts are telling us that the kind
of military response being discussed by the Obama administration would
be "symbolic and fall far short of eliminating Syria's chemical
capabilities." Likewise, the Guardian's headline says it all: "Obama strike would not weaken Assad's military strength, experts warn." And Foreign Policy
reports that one of the U.S. military planners who designed Syria
strike blueprints "has serious misgivings" about the idea that bombing
will improve anything. Even the president himself admits that "we cannot resolve the underlying conflict in Syria with our military."
If you happen to have more credible information and
insight than these well-informed experts, then go right ahead and make
your case. However, if you don't, then take a deep breath, momentarily
suppress your "do something, anything!" impulse, and ask yourself: is it
really so indisputably good, moral or constructive to support dropping
bombs on Syria – most likely in heavily populated civilian areas – to make some sort of abstract political statement, but with no real expectation that doing so will make anything better?
If you can't credibly argue that a military action has
a good shot of making things better, then aren't you submitting to the
kind of ugly militarism that says state-sponsored violence is an end
unto itself? After all, while there are real civilian lives being
extinguished by the monstrous Assad regime, there will also inevitably
be real civilian lives at the explosive end of U.S. cruise missiles (and
that's almost certainly the case no matter how many times professional
politicians throw around reassuring words like "surgical" and "proportional").
Shouldn't humanitarians be thinking about those lives
as as well, and isn't it possible that when you think about all those
lives, there are different conclusions? More specifically, isn't it
possible that there is a more credible case that rejecting military
intervention rather than supporting it would result in less overall
human suffering? And if it is possible, then isn't it disingenuous to
automatically cast non-intervention as sympathy for dictators rather
than as a humanitarian calculation?
That last query can be particularly difficult to
ponder because it challenges the way we are programmed to consider
intervention and non-intervention only on the Rwanda/Nazi continuum. At
one end of the continuum is the Western world opting for
non-intervention in Rwanda, thus permitting a genocide. At the other end
of that continuum is the United States' decision to intervene in World
War II. Though that decision wasn't made primarily to stop the
Holocaust, it did end up rescuing the remaining European Jewish
population from Nazi death camps.
As a method of evaluating international conflicts,
this continuum seems adequate, but it is deliberately deceptive. After
all, the decision to forcefully intervene against Saddam Hussein ended
up creating vast atrocities - and it is hardly clear that the war
resulted in a net reduction in human suffering. So Iraq proves the whole
idea that military intervention is automatically synonymous with
morality or humanitarianism is a ruse, and not an accidental one,
either. It is designed to guarantee certain ideologically driven policy
decisions, regardless of whether those decisions are the right ones.
3. But what about the "red line" of chemical weapons?
President Obama has declared that above and beyond all
other considerations, military action can be predicated solely on
whether an enemy nation has crossed a "red line"
by using chemical weapons. Though the administration insists there is
now clear evidence the Syrian government used chemical weapons, the news
that the evidence is both no "slam dunk" and not being fully divulged to the public
evokes memories of the deliberately misleading rhetoric about Iraq's
supposed WMD, and fears that we again are going to go to war on false
pretenses.
And yet, as legitimate as those fears are, there's an
even deeper problem with the entire "red line" concept. It seems to
suggest that if we are going to use military force for humanitarian
causes, then that military force should not be contingent on the scope
of the atrocities at hand but only on the particular instruments used to
commit said atrocities. It says this because, as CNN
notes, "(In Syria) there have been massacres. Populated areas have been
bombed. Blasts have targeted people lining up for food at bakeries.
People have been decapitated. Millions of Syrians are displaced." And
here's the thing: Those atrocities, which have killed 100,000 Syrians, were committed with conventional weapons.
It stands to reason, then, that predicating military
action exclusively on a chemical weapons "red line" doesn't only say to
the world what the Obama administration suggests it does; more
specifically, it doesn't just say that the use of such unconventional
weapons is unacceptable. It also rather explicitly suggests that in the
U.S. government's eyes, atrocities committed with regular old
conventional weapons are fine, or at least not atrocious enough to
warrant a military response. In other words, it seems to tell other
dictators that as long as they kill and maim their own people with
conventional armaments, they will remain on the acceptable side of the
"red line" and therefore they don't risk a U.S. response.
Noting this isn't to argue for more military
interventions in places where chemical weapons are not used (as
mentioned above, military intervention often makes things worse).
However, it is to spotlight the big problem with the "red line"
construct as a sole basis for humanitarian military intervention.
Chemical weapons are hideous and awful - nobody disputes that. But
pretending that their use alone is more important than the total extent
of a humanitarian crisis runs the risk of effectively absolving and
protecting the monsters who commit crimes through more mundane methods.
4. Because there are no easy answers, isn't there an even bigger imperative for Congress to weigh in?
President Obama's decision to seek congressional
approval for an attack on Syria has been met with surprise among a
political class that has become all too accustomed to presidents
ignoring the Constitution. It has also been met with predictable
criticism from war-mongers in Permanent Washington who evidently believe merely following the Constitution's war powers provisions is somehow a sign of weakness.
On the merits, of course, the reason that Congress
must assert its decision-making power over a military assault on Syria
should be obvious. That reason, in fact, was best articulated by Barack Obama during his first presidential campaign.
Back then, he said, "The President does not have power under the
Constitution to unilaterally authorize a military attack in a situation
that does not involve stopping an actual or imminent threat to the
nation."
The president was indisputably correct. Simply stated,
without the explicit consent of Congress, a president has no
constitutional authority to initiate a war with another country that
poses no imminent threat to the United States. And as none other than
Joe Biden explained only a few years ago, a president who does initiate
such a war without such consent is committing an impeachable offense. End of story.
Now sure, there's a whole "unitary executive" ideology
that absurdly claims the president can do whatever he wants, whenever
he wants, to whomever he wants. But even if you somehow believe that
crap and thus mindlessly dismiss the questions of legality and
constitutionality, you probably shouldn't so flippantly dismiss the
democratic principles that undergird those questions.
Congress was not given the sole power to declare or reject war for no reason. It was granted that authority to better guarantee public consent
for the most dire decisions of all - the decision to use the American
people's resources to kill other human beings, and to officially carry
out such violence in all of our names.
Vesting such a decision in the legislative branch isn't some outdated idea; in this age of what the military calls a state of "persistent conflict," it is as necessary as ever, for it reduces the possibility of a single executive using that state to abuse martial power.
Similarly, the complexity of a potential military
engagement is not a reason to circumvent Congress on the grounds that
the national legislature is allegedly too stupid, too dysfunctional or
too hostile to nuance to make such nuanced decisions. On the contrary,
the complexity of the Syria questions - and the fact that there are no
easy answers - make congressional involvement that much more essential.
That's because when there are no clearly great answers, the best hope of
arriving at the least-bad decision - and one with some modicum of
popular support - is to fully and openly debate it in the place where
all Americans (in theory) have some local representation. And if, as the
Obama administration asserts,
the case for a new war in the Middle East is so obvious and
self-evident, then it should have no problem getting Congress to
authorize that new war.
Without that debate - and without congressional
approval - a war-making decision against a dictator ends up being itself
dictatorial. It ends up not only flouting the Constitution, but telling
Americans that their consent doesn't matter. In short, it declares that
the armed forces are less the public's military and more the Dear
Leader's private army.
Britain - a country that still has an actual royal family - seems to appreciate the inherent problem with that. According to polls,
most Americans appreciate the problem as well, and that has thankfully
forced the Obama administration to submit to the constitutional process.
The critics of such a process seem to pine for a country where the Dear
Leader is allowed to initiate wars without any public consent
whatsoever. Perhaps they would feel more comfortable living in a
dictatorship like Syria.
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