Pfc. Bradley Manning explained how and more importantly, why, he leaked military and government documents. (photo: Reuter
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True Cost of the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan
By Bradley Manning, Reader Supported News
02 March 13
In full statement, whistleblower says most alarming
was the "delightful bloodlust" of US soldiers in Collateral Murder
video.
his statement below was read by Bradley E. Bradley at
a providence inquiry for his formal plea of guilty to one specification as
charged and nine specifications for lesser included offenses. He pled not
guilty to 12 other specifications. This rush transcript was taken by journalist
Alexa O'Brien at the Article 39(a) session of United States v. Pfc. Bradley
Manning on February 28, 2013 at Fort Meade, MD, USA.
Judge Lind: Pfc. Manning you may read your statement.
Pfc. Bradley Manning: Yes, your Honor. I wrote this
statement in the confinement facility. The following facts are provided in
support of the providence inquiry for my court martial, United States v. Pfc.
Bradley E. Manning.
Personal Facts.
I am a twenty-five year old Private First Class in the
United States Army currently assigned to Headquarters and Headquarters Company,
HHC, US Army Garrison (USAG), Joint Base Myer, Henderson Hall, Fort Meyer,
Virginia.
My [missed word] assignment I was assigned to HHC, 2nd
Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum, NY. My primary
military occupational specialty or MOS is 35 Foxtrot intelligence analyst. I
entered active duty status on 2 October 2007. I enlisted with the hope of
obtaining both real world experience and earning benefits under the GI Bill for
college opportunities.
Facts regarding my position as an intelligence
analyst.
In order to enlist in the Army I took the Standard
Armed Services Aptitude Battery or [ASVAB?]. My score on this battery was high
enough for me to qualify for any enlisted MOS positon. My recruiter informed me
that I should select an MOS that complimented my interests outside the
military. In response, I told him that I was interested in geopolitical matters
and information technology. He suggested that I consider becoming an
intelligence analyst.
After researching the intelligence analyst position, I
agreed that this would be a good fit for me. In particular, I enjoyed the fact
that an analyst could use information derived from a variety of sources to
create work products that informed the command of its available choices for
determining the best course of action or COA's. Although the MOS required
working knowledge of computers, it primarily required me to consider how raw
information can be combined with other available intelligence sources in order
to create products that assisted the command in it's situational awareness or
SA.
I accessed that my natural interest in geopolitical
affairs and my computer skills would make me an excellent intelligence analyst.
After enlisting I reported to the Fort Meade military entrance processing
station on 1 October 2007. I then traveled to and reported at Fort Leonard
Wood, Missouri on 2 October 2007 to begin basic combat training or BCT.
Once at Fort Leonard Wood I quickly realized that I
was neither physically nor mentally prepared for the requirements of basic
training. My BCT experience lasted six months instead of the normal ten weeks.
Due to medical issues, I was placed on a hold status. A physical examination
indicated that I sustained injuries to my right soldier and left foot.
Due to those injuries I was unable to continue
'basic'. During medical hold, I was informed that I may be out processed from
the Army, however, I resisted being chaptered out because I felt that I could
overcome my medical issues and continue to serve. On 2[8 or 20?] January 2008,
I returned to basic combat training. This time I was better prepared and I
completed training on 2 April 2008.
I then reported for the MOS specific Advanced
Individual Training or AIT on 7 April 2008. AIT was an enjoyable experience for
me. Unlike basic training where I felt different from the other soldiers, I fit
in did well. I preferred the mental challenges of reviewing a large amount of
information from various sources and trying to create useful or actionable
products. I especially enjoyed the practice of analysis through the use of
computer applications and methods that I was familiar with.
I graduated from AIT on 16 August 2008 and reported to
my first duty station, Fort Drum, NY on 28 August 2008. As an analyst,
Significant Activities or SigActs were a frequent source of information for me
to use in creating work products. I started working extensively with SigActs
early after my arrival at Fort Drum. My computer background allowed me to use
the tools of organic to the Distributed Common Ground System-Army or D6-A
computers to create polished work products for the 2nd Brigade Combat Team
chain of command.
The non-commissioned officer in charge, or NCOIC, of
the S2 section, then Master Sergeant David P. Adkins recognized my skills and
potential and tasked me to work on a tool abandoned by a previously assigned
analyst, the incident tracker. The incident tracker was viewed as a back up to
the Combined Information Data Network Exchange or CIDNE and as a unit,
historical reference to work with.
In the months preceding my upcoming deployment, I
worked on creating a new version of the incident tracker and used SigActs to
populate it. The SigActs I used were from Afghanistan, because at the time our
unit was scheduled to deploy to the Logar and Wardak Provinces of Afghanistan.
Later my unit was reassigned to deploy to Eastern Baghdad, Iraq. At that point,
I removed the Afghanistan SigActs and switched to Iraq SigActs.
As and analyst I viewed the SigActs as historical
data. I believed this view is shared by other all-source analysts as well.
SigActs give a first look impression of a specific or isolated event. This event
can be an improvised explosive device attack or IED, small arms fire engagement
or SAF engagement with a hostile force, or any other event a specific unit
documented and recorded in real time.
In my perspective the information contained within a
single SigAct or group of SigActs is not very sensitive. The events
encapsulated within most SigActs involve either enemy engagements or
causalities. Most of this information is publicly reported by the public
affairs office or PAO, embedded media pools, or host nation HN media.
As I started working with SigActs I felt they were
similar to a daily journal or log that a person may keep. They capture what
happens on a particular day in time. They are created immediately after the
event, and are potentially updated over a period of hours until final version
is published on the Combined Information Data Network Exchange. Each unit has
it's own Standard Operating Procedure or SOP for reporting recording SigActs.
The SOP may differ between reporting in a particular deployment and reporting
in garrison.
In garrison a SigAct normally involves personnel
issues such as driving under the influence or DUI incidents or an automobile
accident involving the death or serious injury of a soldier. The reports starts
at the company level and goes up to the battalion, brigade, and even up to the
division level.
In deployed environment a unit may observe or
participate in an event and a platoon leader or platoon sergeant may report the
event as a SigAct to the company headquarters and the radio transmission
operator or RTO. The commander or RTO will then forward the report to the
battalion battle captain or battle non-commissioned officer or NCO. Once the
battalion battle captain or battle NCO receives the report they will either (1)
notify the battalion operations officer or S3; (2) conduct an action, such as
launching a quick reaction force; or (3) record the event and report and
further report it up the chain of command to the brigade.
The reporting of each event is done by radio or over
the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network or SIPRNet, normally by an assigned
soldier, usually junior enlisted E-4 and below. Once the SigAct is recorded,
the SigAct is further sent up the chain of command. At each level, additional
information can either be added or corrected as needed. Normally within 24 to
48 hours, the updating and reporting or a particular SigAct is complete.
Eventually all reports and SigActs go through the chain of command from brigade
to division and division to corp. At corp level the SigAct is finalized and
[missed word].
The CIDNE system contains a database that is used by
thousands of Department of Defense - DoD personel including soldiers,
civilians, and contractors support. It was the United States Central Command or
CENTCOM reporting tool for operational reporting in Iraq and Afghanistan. Two
separate but similar databases were maintained for each theater - CIDNE-I for
Iraq and CIDNE-A for Afghanistan. Each database encompasses over a hundred
types of reports and other historical information for access. They contain
millions of vetted and finalized directories including operational intelligence
reporting.
CIDNE was created to collect and analyze battle-space
data to provide daily operational and Intelligence Community (IC) reporting
relevant to a commander's daily decision making process. The CIDNE-I and
CIDNE-A databases contain reporting and analysis fields for multiple
disciplines including Human Intelligence or HUMINT reports, Psychological
Operations or PSYOP reports, Engagement reports, Counter Improvised Explosive
Device or CIED reports, SigAct reports, Targeting reports, Social and Cultural
reports, Civil Affairs reports, and Human Terrain reporting.
As an intelligence analyst, I had unlimited access to
the CIDNE-I and CIDNE-A databases and the information contained within them.
Although each table within the database is important, I primarily dealt with
HUMINT reports, SigAct reports and Counter IED reports, because these reports
were used to create a work-product I was required to published as an analyst.
In working on an assignment I looked anywhere and
everywhere for information. As an all-source analyst, this was something that
was expected. The D6-A systems had databases built in, and I utilized them on a
daily basis. This simply was--the search tools available on the D6-A systems on
SIPRNet such as Query Tree and the DoD and Intellink search engines.
Primarily, I utilized the CIDNE database using the
historical and HUMINT reporting to conduct my analysis and provide a back up
for my work product. I did statistical analysis on historical data including
SigActs to back up analysis that were based on HUMINT reporting and produce
charts, graphs, and tables. I also created maps and charts to conduct predictive
analysis based on statistical trends. The SigAct reporting provided a reference
point for what occurred and provided myself and other analysts with the
information to conclude possible outcome.
Although SigAct reporting is sensitive at the time of
their creation, their sensitivity normally dissipates within 48 to 72 hours as
the information is either publicly released or the unit involved is no longer
in the area and not in danger.
It is my understanding that the SigAct reports remain
classified only because they are maintained within CIDNE-- because it is only
accessible on SIPRnet. Everything on CIDNE-I and CIDNE-A to include SigAct
reporting was treated as classified information.
Facts regarding the storage of SigAct Reports.
As part of my training at Fort Drum, I was instructed
to ensure that I create back ups of my work product. The need to create back
ups was particularly acute given the relative instability and reliability of
the computer systems we used in the field during deployment. These computer
systems included both organic and theater provided equipment (TPE) D6-A
machines.
The organic D6-A machines we brought with us into the
field on our deployment were Dell [missed word] laptops and the TPE D6-A
machines were Alienware brand laptops. The [M90?] D6-A laptops were the
preferred machine to use as they were slightly faster and had fewer problems
with dust and temperature than the theater provided Alienware laptops. I used
several D6-A machines during the deployment due to various technical problems
with the laptops.
With these issues several analysts lost information,
but I never lost information due to the multiple backups I created. I attempted
to backup as much relevant information as possible. I would save the
information so that I or another analyst could quickly access it whenever a
machine crashed, SIPRnet connectivity was down, or I forgot where the data was
stored.
When backing up information I would do one or all of
the following things based on my training:
Physical back up. I tried to keep physical back up
copies of information on paper so that the information could be grabbed
quickly. Also, it was easier to brief from hard copies of research and HUMINT
reports.
Local drive back up. I tried to sort out information I
deemed relevant and keep complete copies of the information on each of the
computers I used in the Temporary Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility
or T-SCIF, including my primary and secondary D6-A machines. This was stored
under my user profile on the desktop.
Shared drive backup. Each analyst had access to a 'T'
drive-- what we called 'T' drive shared across the SIPRnet. It allowed others
to access information that was stored on it. S6 operated the 'T' drive.
Compact disk rewritable or CD-RW back up. For larger
datasets I saved the information onto a re-writable disk, labeled the disks,
and stored them in the conference room of the T-SCIF. This redundancy permitted
us to not worry about information loss. If the system crashed, I could easily
pull the information from a secondary computer, the 'T' drive, or one of the
CD-RWs.
If another analysts wanted to access my data, but I
was unavailable she could find my published products directory on the 'T' drive
or on the CD-RWs. I sorted all of my products or research by date, time, and
group; and updated the information on each of the storage methods to ensure
that the latest information was available to them.
During the deployment I had several of the D6-A machines
crash on me. Whenever one of the computer crashed, I usually lost information
but the redundancy method ensured my ability to quickly restore old backup data
and add my current information to the machine when it was repaired or replaced.
I stored the backup CD-RW with larger datasets in the
conference room of the T-SCIF or next to my workstation. I marked the CD-RWs
based on the classification level and its content. Unclassified CD-RWs were
only labeled with the content type and not marked with classification markings.
Early on in the deployment, I only saved and stored the SigActs that were
within or near operational environment.
Later I thought it would be easier to just to save all
of the SigActs onto a CD-RW. The process would not take very long to complete
and so I downloaded the SigActs from CIDNE-I onto a CD-RW. After finishing with
CIDNE-I, I did the same with CIDNE-A. By retrieving the CIDNE-I and CIDNE-A
SigActs I was able to retrieve the information whenever I needed it, and not
rely upon the unreliable and slow SIPRnet connectivity needed to pull. Instead,
I could just find the CD-RW and open up a pre-loaded spreadsheet.
This process began in late December 2009 and continued
through early January 2010. I could quickly export one month of the SigAct data
at a time and download in the background as I did other tasks.
The process took approximately a week for each table.
After downloading the SigAct tables, I periodically updated them, by pulling
the most recent SigActs and simply copying them and pasting them into the
database saved on the CD-RW. I never hid the fact that I had downloaded copies
of both the SigAct tables from CIDNE-I and CIDNE-A. They were stored on
appropriately labeled and marked CD-RW, stored in the open.
I viewed this the saving copies of CIDNE-I and CIDNE-A
as for both for my use and the use of anyone within the S2 section during the
SIPRnet connectivity issues.
In addition to the SigAct tables, I had a large
repository of HUMINT reports and Counter IED reports downloaded from CIDNE-I.
These contained reports that were relevant to the area in and around our
operational environment in Eastern Baghdad and the Diyala Province of Iraq.
In order to compress the data to fit onto a CD-RW, I
used a compression algorithm called 'bzip2'. The program used to compress the
data is called 'WinRAR'. WinRAR is an application that is free, and can be
easily downloaded from the internet via the Non-Secure Internet Relay Protocol
Network or NIPRnet. I downloaded WinRAR on NIPRnet and transfered it to the
D6-A machine user profile desktop using a CD-RW. I did not try to hide the fact
that I was downloading WinRAR onto my SIPRnet D6-A machine or computer.
With the assistance of the bzip2 algorithm using the
WinRAR program, I was able to fit All of the SigActs onto a single CD-RW and
relevant HUMINT and Counter ID reports onto a separate CD-RW.
Facts regarding my knowledge of the WikiLeaks
Organization or WLO.
I first became vaguely aware of the WLO during my AIT
at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, although I did not fully pay attention until the WLO
released purported Short Messaging System or SMS messages from 11 September
2001 on 25 November 2009. At that time references to the release and the WLO
website showed up in my daily Google news open source search for information
related to US foreign policy.
The stories were about how WLO published about
approximately 500,000 messages. I then reviewed the messages myself and
realized that the posted messages were very likely real given the sheer volume
and detail of the content.
After this, I began conducting research on WLO. I conducted
searched on both NIPRnet and SIPRnet on WLO beginning in late November 2009 and
early December 2009. At this time I also began to routinely monitor the WLO
website. In response to one of my searches in 2009, I found the United States
Army Counter Intelligence Center or USACIC report on the WikiLeaks
organization. After reviewing the report, I believed that this report was
possibly the one that my AIT referenced in early 2008.
I may or may not have saved the report on my D6-A
workstation. I know I reviewed the document on other occasions throughout early
2010, and saved it on both my primary and secondary laptops. After reviewing
the report, I continued doing research on WLO. However, based upon my
open-source collection, I discovered information that contradicted the 2008
USACIC report including information that indicated that similar to other press
agencies, WLO seemed to be dedicated to exposing illegal activities and
corruption.
WLO received numerous award and recognition for its
reporting activities. Also, in reviewing the WLO website, I found information
regarding US military SOPs for Camp Delta at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and
information on the then outdated rules of engagement for ROE in Iraq for
cross-border pursuits of former members of Saddam Hussein [missed word]
government.
After seeing the information available on the WLO
website, I continued following it and collecting open sources information from
it. During this time period, I followed several organizations and groups
including wire press agencies such as the Associated Press and Reuters and
private intelligence agencies including Strategic Forecasting or Stratfor. This
practice was something I was trained to do during AIT, and was something that
good analysts were expected to do.
During the searches of WLO, I found several pieces of
information that I found useful in my work product in my work as an analyst,
specifically I recall WLO publishing documents related to weapons trafficking
between two nations that affected my OP. I integrated this information into one
or more of my work products.
In addition to visiting the WLO website, I began
following WLO using Instand Relay Chat or IRC Client called 'XChat' sometime in
early January 2010.
IRC is a protocol for real time internet communications
by messaging and conferencing, colloquially referred to as chat rooms or chats.
The IRC chat rooms are designed for group communication discussion forums. Each
IRC chat room is called a channel - similar to a Television where you can tune
in or follow a channel - so long as it is open and does not require [missed
word].
Once you [missed word] a specific IRC conversation,
other users in the conversation can see that you have joined the room. On the
Internet there are millions of different IRC channels across several services.
Channel topics span a range of topics covering all kinds of interests and
hobbies. The primary reason for following WLO on IRC was curiosit -
particularly in regards to how and why they obtained the SMS messages
referenced above. I believed that collecting information on the WLO would
assist me in this goal.
Initially I simply observed the IRC conversations. I
wanted to know how the organization was structured, and how they obtained their
data. The conversations I viewed were usually technical in nature but sometimes
switched to a lively debate on issue the particular individual may have felt
strongly about.
Over a period of time I became more involved in these
discussions especially when conversations turned to geopolitical events and
information technology topics, such as networking and encryption methods. Based
on these observations, I would describe the WL organization as almost academic
in nature. In addition to the WLO conversations, I participated in numerous
other IRC channels acros at least three different networks. The other IRC
channels I participated in normally dealt with technical topics including with
Linux and Berkley Secure Distribution BSD operating systems or OS's,
networking, encryption algorithms and techniques and other more political
topics, such as politics and [missed word].
I normally engaged in multiple IRC conversations
simultaneously--mostly publicly, but often privately. The XChat client enabled
me to manage these multiple conversations across different channels and
servers. The screen for XChat was often busy, but its screens enabled me to see
when something was interesting. I would then select the conversation and either
observe or participate.
I really enjoyed the IRC conversations pertaining to
and involving the WLO, however, at some point in late February or early March
of 2010, the WLO IRC channel was no longer accessible. Instead, regular
participants of this channel switched to using the Jabber server. Jabber is
another internet communication [missed word] similar but more sophisticated
than IRC.
The IRC and Jabber conversations, allowed me to feel
connected to others even when alone. They helped pass the time and keep
motivated throughout the deployment.
Facts regarding the unauthorized storage and
disclosure of the SigActs.
As indicated above I created copies of the CIDNE-I and
CIDNE-A SigAct tables as part of the process of backing up information. At the
time I did so, I did not intend to use this information for any purpose other
than for back up. However, I later decided to release this information
publicly. At that time, I believe and still believe that these tables are two
of the most significant documents of our time.
On 8 January 2010, I collected the CD-RW I stored in
the conference room of the T-SCIF and placed it into the cargo pocket of my ACU
or Army Combat Uniform. At the end of my shift, I took the CD-RW out of the
T-SCIF and brought it to my Containerized Housing Unit of CHU. I copied the
data onto my personal laptop. Later at the beginning of my shift, I returned
the CD-RW back to the conference room of the T-SCIF. At the time I saved the
SigActs to my laptop, I planned to take them with me on mid-tour leave and
decide what to do with them.
At some point prior to my mid-tour, I transfered the
information from my computer to a Secure Digital memory card from my digital
camera. The SD card for the camera also worked on my computer and allowed me to
store the SigAct tables in a secure manner for transport.
I began mid-tour leave on 23 January 2010, flying from
Atlanta, Georgia to Reagan National Airport in Virginia. I arrived at the home
of my aunt, Debra M. Van Alstyne, in Potomac, Maryland and quickly got into
contact with my then boyfriend, Tyler R. Watkins. Tyler, then a student at
Brandeis University in Waltham, Massachusetts, and I made plans for me to visit
him him Boston, Massachusetts [missed word].
I was excited to see Tyler and planned on talking to
Tyler about where our relationship was going and about my time in Iraq.
However, when I arrived in the Boston area Tyler and I seemed to become distant.
He did not seem very excited about my return from Iraq. I tried talking to him
about our relationship but he refused to make any plans.
I also tried to raising the topic of releasing the
CIDNE-I and CIDNE-A SigAct tables to the public. I asked Tyler hypothetical
questions about what he would do if he had documents that he thought the public
needed access to. Tyler really didn't have a specific answer for me. He tried
to answer the questions and be supportive, but seemed confused by the question
in this context.
I then tried to be more specific, but he asked too
many questions. Rather than try to explain my dilemma, I decided to just drop
the conversation. After a few days in Waltham, I began to feel really bad. I
was over staying my welcome, and I returned to Maryland. I spent the remainder
of my time on leave in the Washington, DC area.
During this time a blizzard bombarded the
mid-atlantic, and I spent a significant period of time essentially stuck in my
aunt's house in Maryland. I began to think about what I knew and the
information I still had in my possession. For me, the SigActs represented the
on the ground reality of both the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
I felt that we were risking so much for people that
seemed unwilling to cooperate with us, leading to frustration and anger on both
sides. I began to become depressed with the situation that we found ourselves
increasingly mired in year after year. The SigActs documented this in great
detail and provide a context of what we were seeing on the ground.
In attempting to conduct counter-terrorism or CT and
counter-insurgency COIN operations we became obsessed with capturing and
killing human targets on lists and not being suspicious of and avoiding
cooperation with our Host Nation partners, and ignoring the second and third
order effects of accomplishing short-term goals and missions. I believe that if
the general public, especially the American public, had access to the
information contained within the CIDNE-I and CIDNE-A tables this could spark a
domestic debate on the role of the military and our foreign policy in general
as [missed word] as it related to Iraq and Afghanistan.
I also believed the detailed analysis of the data over
a long period of time by different sectors of society might cause society to
reevaluate the need or even the desire to even to engage in counterterrorism
and counterinsurgency operations that ignore the complex dynamics of the people
living in the effected environment everyday.
At my aunt's house I debated what I should do with the
SigActs - in particular whether I should hold on to them - or expose them
through a press agency. At this point I decided that it made sense to try to
expose the SigAct tables to an American newspaper. I first called my local news
paper, The Washington Post, and spoke with a woman saying that she was a
reporter. I asked her if the Washington Post would be interested in receiving
information that would have enormous value to the American public.
Although we spoke for about five minutes concerning
the general nature of what I possessed, I do not believe she took me seriously.
She informed me that the Washington Post would possibly be interested, but that
such decisions were made only after seeing the information I was referring to
and after consideration by senior editors.
I then decided to contact [missed word] the most
popular newspaper, The New York Times. I called the public editor number on The
New York Times website. The phone rang and was answered by a machine. I went
through the menu to the section for news tips. I was routed to an answering
machine. I left a message stating I had access to information about Iraq and
Afghanistan that I believed was very important. However, despite leaving my
Skype phone number and personal email address, I never received a reply from
The New York Times.
I also briefly considered dropping into the office for
the Political Commentary blog, Politico, however the weather conditions during
my leave hampered my efforts to travel. After these failed efforts I had
ultimately decided to submit the materials to the WLO. I was not sure if the
WLO would actually publish these SigAct tables [missed a few words]. I was
concerned that they might not be noticed by the American media. However, based
upon what I read about the WLO through my research described above, this seemed
to be the best medium for publishing this information to the world within my
reach.
At my aunts house I joined in on an IRC conversation
and stated I had information that needed to be shared with the world. I wrote
that the information would help document the true cost of the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan. One of the individuals in the IRC asked me to describe the
information. However, before I could describe the information another
individual pointed me to the link for the WLO web site online submission
system. After ending my IRC connection, I considered my options one more time.
Ultimately, I felt that the right thing to do was to release the SigActs.
On 3 February 2010, I visited the WLO website on my
computer and clicked on the submit documents link. Next I found the submit your
information online link and elected to submit the SigActs via the onion router
or TOR anonymizing network by special link. TOR is a system intended to provide
anonymity online. The software routes internet traffic through a network of
servers and other TOR clients in order to conceal the user's location and
identity.
I was familiar with TOR and had it previously
installed on a computer to anonymously monitor the social media website of
militia groups operating within central Iraq. I followed the prompts and
attached the compressed data files of CIDNE-I and CIDNE-A SigActs. I attached a
text file I drafted while preparing to provide the documents to the Washington
Post. It provided rough guidelines saying 'It's already been sanitized of any
source identifying information. You might need to sit on this information -
perhaps 90 to 100 days to figure out how best to release such a large amount of
data and to protect its source. This is possibly one of the more significant
documents of our time removing the fog of war and revealing the true nature of
twenty-first century asymmetric warfare. Have a good day.'
After sending this, I left the SD card in a camera
case at my aunt's house in the event I needed it again in the future. I
returned from mid-tour leave on 11 February 2010. Although the information had
not yet been publicly by the WLO, I felt this sense of relief by them having
it. I felt I had accomplished something that allowed me to have a clear
conscience based upon what I had seen and read about and knew were happening in
both Iraq and Afghanistan everyday.
Facts regarding the unauthorized storage and
disclosure of 10 Reykjavik 13.
I first became aware of the diplomatic cables during
my training period in AIT. I later learned about the Department of State or DoS
Net-centric Diplomacy NCD portal from the 2/10 Brigade Combat Team S2, Captain
Steven Lim. Captain Lim sent a section wide email to the other analysts and
officer in late December 2009 containing the SIPRnet link to the portal along
with the instructions to look at the cables contained within them and to
incorporate them into our work product.
Shortly after this I also noticed the diplomatic
cables were being reported to in products from the corp level US Forces Iraq or
US-I. Based upon Captain Lim's direction to become familiar with its contents,
I read virtually every published cable concerning Iraq.
I also began scanning the database and reading other
random cables that piqued my curiosity. It was around this time - in early to
mid-January of 2010, that I began searching the database for information on
Iceland. I became interested in Iceland due to the IRC conversations I viewed
in the WLO channel discussing an issue called Icesave. At this time I was not
very familiar with the topic, but it seemed to be a big issue for those
participating in the conversation. This is when I decided to investigate and conduct
a few searches on Iceland and find out more.
At the time, I did not find anything discussing the
Icesave issue either directly or indirectly. I then conducted an open source
search for Icesave. I then learned that Iceland was involved in a dispute with
the United Kingdom and the Netherlands concerning the financial collapse of one
or more of Iceland's banks. According to open source reporting much of the
public controversy involved the United Kingdom's use of anti-terrorism
legislation against Iceland in order to freeze Icelandic access for payment of
the guarantees for UK depositors that lost money.
Shortly after returning from mid-tour leave, I
returned to the Net Centric Diplomacy portal to search for information on
Iceland and Icesave as the topic had not abated on the WLO IRC channel. To my
surprise, on 14 February 2010, I found the cable 10 Reykjavik 13, which
referenced the Icesave issue directly.
The cable published on 13 January 2010 was just over
two pages in length. I read the cable and quickly concluded that Iceland was
essentially being bullied diplomatically by two larger European powers. It
appeared to me that Iceland was out viable options and was coming to the US for
assistance. Despite the quiet request for assistance, it did not appear that we
were going to do anything.
From my perspective it appeared that we were not
getting involved due to the lack of long term geopolitical benefit to do so.
After digesting the contents of 10 Reykjavik 13 I debated whether this was
something I should send to the WLO. At this point the WLO had not published or
acknowledged receipt of the CIDNE-I and CIDNE-A tables. Despite not knowing
that the SigActs were a priority for the WLO, I decided the cable was something
that would be important. I felt that I would be able to right a wrong by having
them publish this document. I burned the information onto a CD-RW on 15
February 2010, took it to my CHU, and saved it onto my personal laptop.
I navigated to the WLO website via a TOR connection
like before and uploaded the document via the secure form. Amazingly, when WLO
published 10 Reykjavik 13 within hours, proving that the form worked and that
they must have received the SigAct tables.
Facts regarding the unauthorized storage and
disclosure of the 12 July 2007 aerial weapons team or AW team video.
During the mid-February 2010 time frame the 2nd
Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division targeting analysts, then Specialist
Jihrleah W. Showman discussed a video that Ms. Showman had found on the 'T'
drive.
The video depicted several individuals being engaged
by an aerial weapons team. At first I did not consider the video very special,
as I have viewed countless other war porn type videos depicting combat.
However, the recording of audio comments by the aerial weapons team crew and
the second engagement in the video of an unarmed bongo truck troubled me.
As Showman and a few other analysts and officers in
the T-SCIF commented on the video and debated whether the crew violated the
rules of engagement or ROE in the second engagement, I shied away from this
debate, instead conducting some research on the event. I wanted to learn what
happened and whether there was any background to the events of the day that the
event occurred, 12 July 2007.
Using Google I searched for the event by its date by
its general location. I found several new accounts involving two Reuters
employees who were killed during the aerial weapon team engagement. Another
story explained that Reuters had requested for a copy of the video under the
Freedom of Information Act or FOIA. Reuters wanted to view the video in order
to understand what had happened and to improve their safety practices in combat
zones. A spokesperson for Reuters was quoted saying that the video might help
avoid the reoccurrence of the tragedy and believed there was a compelling need
for the immediate release of the video.
Despite the submission of the FOIA request, the news
account explained that CENTCOM replied to Reuters stating that they could not
give a time frame for considering a FOIA request and that the video might no
longer exist. Another story I found written a year later said that even though
Reuters was still pursuing their request. They still did not receive a formal
response or written determination in accordance with FOIA.
The fact neither CENTCOM or Multi National Forces Iraq
or MNF-I would not voluntarily release the video troubled me further. It was
clear to me that the event happened because the aerial weapons team mistakenly
identified Reuters employees as a potential threat and that the people in the
bongo truck were merely attempting to assist the wounded. The people in the van
were not a threat but merely 'good samaritans'. The most alarming aspect of the
video to me, however, was the seemly delightful bloodlust they appeared to
have.
The dehumanized the individuals they were engaging and
seemed to not value human life by referring to them as quote "dead
bastards" unquote and congratulating each other on the ability to kill in
large numbers. At one point in the video there is an individual on the ground
attempting to crawl to safety. The individual is seriously wounded. Instead of
calling for medical attention to the location, one of the aerial weapons team
crew members verbally asks for the wounded person to pick up a weapon so that
he can have a reason to engage. For me, this seems similar to a child torturing
ants with a magnifying glass.
While saddened by the aerial weapons team crew's lack
of concern about human life, I was disturbed by the response of the discovery
of injured children at the scene. In the video, you can see that the bongo
truck driving up to assist the wounded individual. In response the aerial
weapons team crew-- as soon as the individuals are a threat, they repeatedly
request for authorization to fire on the bongo truck and once granted they
engage the vehicle at least six times.
Shortly after the second engagement, a mechanized
infantry unit arrives at the scene. Within minutes, the aerial weapons team
crew learns that children were in the van and despite the injuries the crew
exhibits no remorse. Instead, they downplay the significance of their actions,
saying quote 'Well, it's their fault for bringing their kid's into a battle'
unquote.
The aerial weapons team crew members sound like they
lack sympathy for the children or the parents. Later in a particularly
disturbing manner, the aerial weapons team verbalizes enjoyment at the sight of
one of the ground vehicles driving over a body - or one of the bodies. As I
continued my research, I found an article discussing the book, The Good
Soldiers, written by Washington Post writer David Finkel.
In Mr. Finkel book, he writes about the aerial weapons
team attack. As, I read an online excerpt in Google Books, I followed Mr.
Finkel's account of the event belonging to the video. I quickly realize that
Mr. Finkel was quoting, I feel in verbatim, the audio communications of the aerial
weapons team crew.
It is clear to me that Mr. Finkel obtained access and
a copy of the video during his tenue as an embedded journalist. I was aghast at
Mr. Finkel's portrayal of the incident. Reading his account, one would believe
the engagement was somehow justified as 'payback' for an earlier attack that
lead to the death of a soldier. Mr. Finkel ends his account by discussing how a
soldier finds an individual still alive from the attack. He writes that the
soldier finds him and sees him gesture with his two forefingers together, a
common method in the Middle East to communicate that they are friendly.
However, instead of assisting him, the soldier makes an obscene gesture
extending his middle finger.
The individual apparently dies shortly thereafter.
Reading this, I can only think of how this person was simply trying to help
others, and then he quickly finds he needs help as well. To make matter worse,
in the last moments of his life, he continues to express his friendly gesture -
only to find himself receiving this well known gesture of unfriendliness. For
me it's all a big mess, and I am left wondering what these things mean, and how
it all fits together. It burdens me emotionally.
I saved a copy of the video on my workstation. I
searched for and found the rules of engagement, the rules of engagement
annexes, and a flow chart from the 2007 time period - as well as an
unclassified Rules of Engagement smart card from 2006. On 15 February 2010 I
burned these documents onto a CD-RW, the same time I burned the 10 Reykjavik 13
cable onto a CD-RW. At the time, I placed the video and rules for engagement
information onto my personal laptop in my CHU. I planned to keep this
information there until I redeployed in Summer 2010. I planned on providing
this to the Reuters office in London to assist them in preventing events such
as this in the future.
However, after the WLO published 10 Reykjavik 13 I
altered my plans. I decided to provide the video and the rules of engagement to
them so that Reuters would have this information before I re-deployed from
Iraq. On about 21 February 2010, I described above, I used the WLO submission
form and uploaded the documents. The WLO released the video on 5 April 2010.
After the release, I was concern about the impact of the video and how it would
been received by the general public.
I hoped that the public would be as alarmed as me
about the conduct of the aerial weapons team crew members. I wanted the
American public to know that not everyone in Iraq and Afghanistan are targets
that needed to be neutralized, but rather people who were struggling to live in
the pressure cooker environment of what we call asymmetric warfare. After the
release I was encouraged by the response in the media and general public, who
observed the aerial weapons team video. As I hoped, others were just as
troubled-- if not more troubled that me by what they saw.
At this time, I began seeing reports claiming that the
Department of Defense an CENTCOM could not confirm the authenticity of the
video. Additionally, one of my supervisors, Captain Casey Fulton, stated her
belief that the video was not authentic. In her response, I decided to ensure
that the authenticity of the video would not be questioned in the future. On 25
February 2010, I emailed Captain Fulton, a link to the video that was on our
'T' drive, and a copy of the video published by WLO that was collected by the
open source center, so she could compare them herself.
Around this time frame, I burned a second CD-RW
containing the aerial weapons team video. In order to made it appear authentic,
I placed a classification sticker and wrote Reuters FOIA REQ on its face. I
placed the CD-RW in one of my personal CD cases containing a set of 'Starting
Out in Arabic CD's.' I planned on mailing out the CD-RW to Reuters after our
re-deployment, so they could have a copy that was unquestionably authentic.
Almost immediately after submitting the aerial weapons
team video and rules of engagement documents I notified the individuals in the
WLO IRC to expect an important submission. I received a response from an
individual going by the handle of 'ox' - at first our conversations were
general in nature, but over time as our conversations progressed, I accessed
this individual to be an important part of the WLO.
Due to the strict adherence of anonymity by the WLO,
we never exchanged identifying information. However, I believe the individual
was likely Mr. Julian Assange [he pronounced it with three syllables], Mr.
Daniel Schmidt, or a proxy representative of Mr. Assange and Schmidt.
As the communications transfered from IRC to the
Jabber client, I gave 'ox' and later 'pressassociation' the name of Nathaniel
Frank in my address book, after the author of a book I read in 2009.
After a period of time, I developed what I felt was a
friendly relationship with Nathaniel. Our mutual interest in information
technology and politics made our conversations enjoyable. We engaged in
conversation often. Sometimes as long as an hour or more. I often looked
forward to my conversations with Nathaniel after work.
The anonymity that was provided by TOR and the Jabber
client and the WLO's policy allowed me to feel I could just be myself, free of
the concerns of social labeling and perceptions that are often placed upon me
in real life. In real life, I lacked a closed friendship with the people I
worked with in my section, the S2 section.
In my section, the S2 section supported battalions and
the 2nd Brigade Combat Team as a whole. For instance, I lacked close ties with
my roommate to his discomfort regarding my perceived sexual orientation. Over
the next few months, I stayed in frequent contact with Nathaniel. We conversed
on nearly a daily basis and I felt that we were developing a friendship.
Conversations covered many topics and I enjoyed the
ability to talk about pretty much everything, and not just the publications
that the WLO was working on. In retrospect that these dynamics were artificial
and were valued more by myself than Nathaniel. For me these conversations
represented an opportunity to escape from the immense pressures and anxiety
that I experienced and built up through out the deployment. It seems that as I
tried harder to fit in at work, the more I seemed to alienate my peers and lose
respect, trust, and support I needed.
Facts regarding the unauthorized storage and
disclosure of documents related to the detainments by the Iraqi Federal Police
or FP, and the Detainee Assessment Briefs, and the USACIC United States Army
Counter Intelligence Center report.
On 27 February 2010, a report was received from a
subordinate battalion. The report described an event in which the Federal
Police or FP detained 15 individuals for printing anti-Iraqi literature. On 2
March 2010, I received instructions from an S3 section officer in the 2nd
Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division Tactical Operation Center or TOC to
investigate the matter, and figure out who the quote 'bad guys' unquote were
and how significant this event was for the Federal Police.
Over the course of my research I found that none of
the individuals had previous ties to anti-Iraqi actions or suspected terrorist
militia groups. A few hours later, I received several [playlist?] from the
scene - from this subordinate battalion. They were accidentally sent to an
officer on a different team on the S2 section and she forwarded them to me.
These photos included picture of the individuals,
pallets of unprinted paper and seized copies of the final printed material or
the printed document; and a high resolution photo of the printed material
itself. I printed up one [missed word] copy of a high resolution photo-- I
laminated it for ease of use and transfer. I then walked to the TOC and
delivered the laminated copy to our category two interpreter.
She reviewed the information and about a half and hour
later delivered a rough written transcript in English to the S2 section. I read
the transcript and followed up with her, asking her for her take on the
content. She said it was easy for her to transcribe verbatim, since I blew up
the photograph and laminated it. She said the general nature of the document
was benign. The document, as I had sensed as well, was merely a scholarly
critique of the then current Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.
It detailed corruption within the cabinet of
al-Maliki's government and the financial impact of his corruption on the Iraqi
people. After discovering this discrepancy between the Federal Police's report
and the interpreter's transcript, I forwarded this discovery to the top OIC and
the battle NCOIC. The top OIC and the overhearing battle captain informed me
that they didn't need or want to know this information anymore. They told me to
quote "drop it" unquote and to just assist them and the Federal
Police in finding out, where more of these print shops creating quote'
anti-Iraqi literature' unquote.
I couldn't believe what I heard and I returned to the
T-SCIF and complained to the other analysts and my section NCOIC about what
happened. Some were sympathetic, but no one wanted to do anything about it.
I am the type of person who likes to know how things
work. And, as an analyst, this means I always want to figure out the truth.
Unlike other analysts in my section or other sections within the 2nd Brigade
Combat Team, I was not satisfied with just scratching the surface and producing
canned or cookie cutter assessments. I wanted to know why something was the way
it was, and what we could to correct or mitigate a situation.
I knew that if I continued to assist the Baghdad
Federal Police in identifying the political opponents of Prime Minister
al-Maliki, those people would be arrested and in the custody of the Special
Unit of the Baghdad Federal Police and very likely tortured and not seen again
for a very long time-- if ever.
Instead of assisting the Special Unit of the Baghdad
Federal Police, I decided to take the information and expose it to the WLO, in
the hope that before the upcoming 7 March 2010 election, they could generate
some immediate press on the issue and prevent this unit of the Federal Police
from continuing to crack down in political opponents of al-Maliki.
On 4 March 2010, I burned the report, the photos, the
high resolution copy of the pamphlet, and the interpreters hand written
transcript onto a CD-RW. I took the CD-RW to my CHU and copied the data onto my
personal computer. Unlike the times before, instead of uploading the
information through the WLO website submission form. I made a Secure File
Transfer Protocol or SFTP connection to a file drop box operated by the WLO.
The drop box contained a folder that allowed me to
upload directly into it. Saving files into this directory. Allowed anyone with
log in access to server to view and download them. After uploading these files
to the WLO, on 5 March 2010, I notified Nathaniel over Jabber. Although
sympathetic, he said that the WLO needed more information to confirm the event
in order for it to be published or to gain interest in the international media.
I attempted to provide the specifics, but to my
disappointment, the WLO website chose not to publish this information. At the
same time, I began sifting through information from the US Southern Command or
SOUTHCOM and Joint Task Force Guantanamo, Cuba or JTF-GTMO. The thought
occurred to me - although unlikely, that I wouldn't be surprised if the
individuals detainees by the Federal Police might be turned over back into US
custody - and ending up in the custody of Joint Task Force Guantanamo.
As I digested through the information on Joint Task
Force Guantanamo, I quickly found the Detainee Assessment Briefs or DABs. I
previously came across the document's before in 2009 but did not think much
about them. However, this time I was more curious in this search and I found
them again.
The DABs were written in standard DoD memorandum
format and addressed the commander US SOUTHCOM. Each memorandum gave basic and
background information about a detainee held at some point by Joint Task Force
Guantanamo. I have always been interested on the issue of the moral efficacy of
our actions surrounding Joint Task Force Guantanamo. On the one hand, I have
always understood the need to detain and interrogate individuals who might wish
to harm the United States and our allies, however, I felt that what we were
trying to do at Joint Task Force Guantanamo.
However, the more I became educated on the topic, it
seemed that we found ourselves holding an increasing number of individuals
indefinitely that we believed or knew to be innocent, low level foot soldiers
that did not have useful intelligence and would be released if they were still
held in theater.
I also recall that in early 2009 the, then newly
elected president, Barack Obama, stated that he would close Joint Task Force
Guantanamo, and that the facility compromised our standing over all, and diminished
our quote 'moral authority' unquote.
After familiarizing myself with the Detainee
Assessment Briefs, I agree. Reading through the Detainee Assessment Briefs, I
noticed that they were not analytical products, instead they contained
summaries of tear line versions of interim intelligence reports that were old
or unclassified. None of the DABs contained the names of sources or quotes from
tactical interrogation reports or TIR's. Since the DABs were being sent to the
US SOUTHCOM commander, I assessed that they were intended to provide very
general background information on each of the detainees and not a detailed
assessment.
In addition to the manner in which the DAB's were
written, I recognized that they were at least several years old, and discussed
detainees that were already released from Joint Task Force Guantanamo. Based on
this, I determined that the DAB's were not very important fro either an
intelligence or a national security standpoint. On 7 March 2010, during my
Jabber conversation with Nathaniel, I asked him if he thought the DAB's were of
any use to anyone.
Nathaniel indicated, although he did not believe that
they were of political significance, he did believe that they could be used to
merge into the general historical account of what occurred at Joint Task Force
Guantanamo. He also thought that the DAB's might be helpful to the legal
counsel of those currently and previously held at JTF-GTMO.
After this discussion, I decided to download the data.
I used an application called Wget to download the DAB's. I downloaded Wget off
of the NIPRnet laptop in the T-SCIF, like other programs. I saved that onto a
CD-RW, and placed the executable in my 'My Documents' directory on my user
profile, on the D6-A SIPRnet workstation.
On 7 March 2010, I took the list of links for the
detainee assessment briefs, and Wget downloaded them sequentially. I burned the
data onto a CD-RW, and took it into my CHU, and copied them onto my personal
computer. On 8 March 2010, I combined the Detainee Assessment Briefs with the
United States Army Counterintelligence Center reports on the WLO, into a
compressed IP file. Zip files contain multiple files which are compressed to
reduce their size.
After creating the zip file, I uploaded the file onto
their cloud drop box via Secure File Transfer Protocol. Once these were
uploaded, I notified Nathaniel that the information was in the 'x' directory,
which had been designated for my own use. Earlier that day, I downloaded the
USACIC report on WLO.
As discussed about, I previously reviewed the report
on numerous occasions and although I saved the document onto the work station
before, I could not locate it. After I found the document again, I downloaded
it to my work station, and saved it onto the same CD-RW as the Detainee Assessment
Briefs described above.
Although my access included a great deal of
information, I decided I had nothing else to send to WLO after sending the
Detainee Assessment Briefs and the USACIC report. Up to this point I had sent
them the following: the CIDNE-I and CIDNE-A SigActs tables; the Reykjavik 13
Department of State Cable; the 12 July 2007 aerial weapons team video and the
2006-2007 rules of engagement documents; the SigAct report and supporting
documents concerning the 15 individuals detained by the Baghdad Federal Police;
the USSOUTHCOM and Joint Task Force Guantanamo Detainee Assessment Briefs; a
USACIC report on the WikiLeaks website and the WikiLeaks organization.
Over the next few weeks I did not send any additional
information to the WLO. I continued to converse with Nathaniel over the Jabber
client and in the WLO IRC channel. Although I stopped sending documents to WLO,
no one associated with the WLO pressures me into giving more information. The
decisions that I made to send documents and information to the WLO and the
website were my own decisions, and I take full responsibility for my actions.
Facts regarding the unauthorized disclosure of Other
Government Documents.
One 22 March 2010, I downloaded two documents. I found
these documents over the course of my normal duties as an analysts. Based on my
training and the guidance of my superiors, I look at as much information as
possible.
Doings so provided me with the ability to make
connections that others might miss. On several occasions during the month of
March, I accessed information from a Government entity. I read several
documents from a section within this Government entity. The content of two of
these documents upset me greatly. I had difficulty believing what this section
was doing.
On 22 March 2010, I downloaded the two documents that
I found troubling. I compressed them into a zip file named blah.zip and burned
them onto a CD-RW. I took the CD-RW to my CHU and saved the file to my personal
computer.
I uploaded the information to the WLO website using
the designated prompts.
Facts regarding the unauthorized storage and
disclosure of the Net Centric Diplomacy Department of State Cables.
In late March of 2010, I received a warning over
Jabber from Nathaniel, that the WLO website would be publishing the aerial
weapons team video. He indicated that the WLO would be very busy and the
frequency and intensity of our Jabber conversations decrease significantly.
During this time, I had nothing but work to distract me.
I read more of the diplomatic cables published on the
Department of State Net Centric Diplomacy. With my insatiable curiosity and
interest in geopolitics I became fascinated with them. I read not only the
cables on Iraq, but also about countries and events that I found interesting.
The more I read, the more I was fascinated with the
way that we dealt with other nations and organizations. I also began to think
the documented backdoor deals and seemingly criminal activity that didn't seem
characteristic of the de facto leader of the free world.
Up to this point,during the deployment, I had issues I
struggled with and difficulty at work. Of the documents release, the cables
were the only one I was not absolutely certain couldn't harm the United States.
I conducted research on the cables published on the Net Centric Diplomacy, as
well as how Department of State cables worked in general.
In particular, I wanted to know how each cable was
published on SIRPnet via the Net Centric Diplomacy. As part of my open source
research, I found a document published by the Department of State on its
official website.
The document provided guidance on caption markings for
individual cables and handling instructions for their distribution. I quickly
learned the caption markings clearly detailed the sensitivity of the Department
of State cables. For example, NODIS or No Distribution was used for messages at
the highest sensitivity and were only distributed to the authorized recipients.
The SIPDIS or SIPRnet distribution caption was applied
only to recording of other information messages that were deemed appropriate
for a release for a wide number of individuals. According to the Department of
State guidance for a cable to have the SIPDIS [missed word] caption, it could
not include other captions that were intended to limit distribution.
The SIPDIS caption was only for information that could
only be shared with anyone with access to SIPRnet. I was aware that thousands
of military personel, DoD, Department of State, and other civilian agencies had
easy access to the tables. The fact that the SIPDIS caption was only for wide
distribution made sense to me, given that the vast majority of the Net Centric
Diplomacy Cables were not classified.
The more I read the cables, the more I came to the
conclusion that this was the type of information that should become public. I
once read a and used a quote on open diplomacy written after the First World
War and how the world would be a better place if states would avoid making
secret pacts and deals with and against each other.
I thought these cables were a prime example of a need
for a more open diplomacy. Given all of the Department of State cables that I
read, the fact that most of the cables were unclassified, and that all the
cables have a SIPDIS caption.
I believe that the public release of these cables
would not damage the United States, however, I did believe that the cables
might be embarrassing, since they represented very honest opinions and statements
behind the backs of other nations and organizations.
In many ways these cables are a catalogue of cliques
and gossip. I believed exposing this information might make some within the
Department of State and other government entities unhappy. On 22 March 2010, I
began downloading a copy of the SIPDIS cables using the program Wget, described
above.
I used instances of the Wget application to download
the Net Centric Diplomacy cables in the background. As I worked on my daily
tasks, the Net centric Diplomacy cables were downloaded from 28 March 2010 to 9
April 2010. After downloading the cables, I saved them on to a CD-RW.
These cables went from the earliest dates in Net
Centric Diplomacy to 28 February 2010. I took the CD-RW to my CHU on 10 April 2010.
I sorted the cables on my personal computer, compressed them using the bzip2
compression algorithm described above, and uploaded them to the WLO via
designated drop box described above.
On 3 May 2010, I used Wget to download and update of
the cables for the months of March 2010 and April 2010 and saved the
information onto a zip file and burned it to a CD-RW. I then took the CD-RW to
my CHU and saved those to my computer. I later found that the file was
corrupted during the transfer. Although I intended to re-save another copy of
these cables, I was removed from the T-SCIF on 8 May 2010 after an altercation.
Facts regarding the unauthorized storage and
disclosure of Garani, Farah Province Afghanistan 15-6 Investigation and Videos.
[NB Pfc. Manning plead 'not guilty' to the
Specification 11, Charge II for the Garani Video as charged by the government,
which alleged as November charge date. Read more here.]
In late March 2010, I discovered a US CENTCOM directly
on a 2009 airstrike in Afghanistan. I was searching CENTCOM I could use as an
analyst. As described above, this was something that myself and other officers
did on a frequent basis. As I reviewed the incident and what happened. The
airstrike occurred in the Garani village in the Farah Province, Northwestern
Afghanistan. It received worldwide press coverage during the time as it was
reported that up to 100 to 150 Afghan civilians - mostly women and children -
were accidentally killed during the airstrike.
After going through the report and the [missed word]
annexes, I began to review the incident as being similar to the 12 July 2007
aerial weapons team engagements in Iraq. However, this event was noticeably
different in that it involved a significantly higher number of individuals,
larger aircraft and much heavier munitions. Also, the conclusions of the report
are more disturbing than those of the July 2007 incident.
I did not see anything in the 15-6 report or its
annexes that gave away sensitive information. Rather, the investigation and its
conclusions were - what those involved should have done, and how to avoid an
event like this from occurring again.
After investigating the report and its annexes, I
downloaded the 15-6 investigation, PowerPoint presentations, and several other
supporting documents to my D6-A workstation. I also downloaded three zip files
containing the videos of the incident. I burned this information onto a CD-RW
and transfered it to the personal computer in my CHU. I did later that day or
the next day - I uploaded the information to the WL website this time using a
new version of the WLO website submission form.
Unlike other times using the submission form above, I
did not activate the TOR anonymizer. Your Honor, this concludes my statement
and facts for this providence inquiry.
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