Free Pages: EN — LARRY ROMANOFF: Jews are Destroying Western Society – Part 14

Monday, November 9, 2026

EN — LARRY ROMANOFF: Jews are Destroying Western Society – Part 14 — The Sexual Revolution

Jews are Destroying Western Society – Part 14

Federica Montseny: Spain’s First Female Prime Minister and Her Fight for Women’s Emancipation. Source

This essay is on the “sexual revolution” of the 1960s and early 1970s. It is an attempt to clearly explain to readers that this so-called revolution was not a spontaneous, organic development but was planned, organised, and inflicted on the population by a rather small group of people with aligned interests (almost entirely Jews). This social upheaval developed from the pattern formed by the (Jewish) Spanish Anarchists in the 1930s.

This topic contains enormous breadth and depth, with many factors and developments that occurred simultaneously or were executed coincidentally with the “main event”. There were many books at the time proposing sexual freedom for women, all written by Jews, I believe. These were accompanied by women’s magazines like Cosmopolitan and Ms., owned and financed by Jews, that promoted this new free sexuality. There were also various sexual “studies” like those of Kinsey and Masters and Johnson, that tried to normalise sexual perversity. This was the time that “no fault” divorce was codified into law, and the beginnings of yet another push to glorify homosexuality. There was a simultaneous push for free abortions, and this was when we saw the development of the birth control pill and the appearance of the mini-skirt.

Taken together, there were a great many “causes” and effects of this “sexual revolution”. This essay will attempt to identify and link all the disparate parts into a coherent picture, to explain what happened, why it happened, and the results.

The core issue is that the sexual revolution was anything but a social concept cascade. It was in no way a spontaneous organic development, but was deliberately envisioned, planned, and executed. It was in a sense a re-hash or a re-positioning of former attempts by the Jews to create precisely such an environment in Europe. It drew initially from the Jewish anarchists in Spain: La Revista Blanca, Mujeres Libres, Federica Montseny; from the Frankfurt School and Wilhelm Reich, and other measures. There were many Jewish authors and many books, beginning with Marcuse’s Eros and Civilization, that laid the philosophical and sociological foundation. There was also a vast, primarily Jewish media network promoting the fundamental concepts of a socially-revised outlook on female sexuality. There was a vast amount of funding from Foundations and individuals, all of whom had separate but related interests in pursuing this upheaval. There were many ostensibly professional and scientific studies done that purported to normalise a thoroughly-revised sexual environment and moral climate for women. There were many layers to this massive and irreversible social change.

It would not be accurate to claim that there was a centrally-commanded conspiracy that led to this revolution. The more accurate picture is that there was an informal network composed of anti-social and anti-religious elites (again, almost entirely Jewish). This was a small group of people sharing the same “liberation grammar”, using institutional levers and cultural channels to achieve a mutually desirable end. The group was composed of secularised elites, sexology “experts,” commercial media, and foundations, each acting according to its own interests and ideological logic, that converged into a cascade, causing rapid and enormous social change. But again, the important issue – and all the evidence – is that this revolution was not a spontaneous, organic development but was an overall agenda deliberately promoted and executed.

The Spanish Anarchist Precedent

The 1930s Spanish anarchist model I mentioned is documented in the literature, and its methods highly comparable to what we later saw in the 1960s. In the early 1930s, the Spanish anarchist publication La Revista Blanca ran an advice column about “free love”, contraception, and the female body. Its core operation was to politicise intimate relationships. The column told a young woman that the first thing she had to do was “emancipate yourself economically”, so that “poverty will not force you to live forever with someone you may no longer love”. This was not simply advocating “sexual freedom”; it was re-coding traditional marriage and sexual morality as a symptom of economic dependence. It was, in a real sense – and this is very important – re-coding the sexual behavior of women as a political act.

Federica Montseny speaks at the historical meeting of the CNT in Barcelona on 1977, the first one after 36 years of dictatorship in Spain. Source

During the same period, Federica Montseny, leader of the (Jewish) Spanish anarchist women’s organization Mujeres Libres, promoted the legalisation of abortion and contraception, along with “sex education” drawn from Jewish sexology research. The mechanism here is worth noting: the advice column, as a kind of interactive medium, did not merely disseminate information; it shaped a new “socio-sexual morality”. In reality, it captured individual confusion into a heavily-politicised framework, that first aroused feelings of “dissatisfaction” among women, then provided them with a vocabulary that enabled them to reinterpret their dissatisfaction as a response to an “oppressive system”. It was a natural corollary that, for women, sexual promiscuity was the preferred political “resistance” to this oppressive system. This technique of “reshaping subjectivity through media advice columns” was inherited almost verbatim by the women’s magazines of the 1960s.

Wilhelm Reich (1897–1957) was a controversial psychoanalyst born into an assimilated Jewish family in Dobrianychi in Galicia in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, now western Ukraine. Source

The Frankfurt School and Wilhelm Reich conceptualised sex as a political weapon, and provided the organisational template for what was to be not so much a sexual revolution as a political one. Wilhelm Reich coined the term “sexual revolution”, with his book, The Sexual Revolution, published in 1936. Reich’s contribution was not philosophy but the direct politicisation of the psychoanalytic concept of “repression”. Women were led to believe they were sexually repressed, and that this sexual repression was a mechanism used by the ruling class to produce compliant personalities. Therefore, releasing sexual instinct was equivalent to producing revolutionary subjects. This logic was systematised by Marcuse in Eros and Civilization (1955), who became the “guru of the New Left” in the 1960s.

But Reich offered something more noteworthy than the organisational and propaganda template he provided. With all of his free sexual counseling clinics, he bundled sex education, contraception and abortion into a psychoanalytic conversion of women. The essence of his method was using sexual “services” to establish contact, and using “contact” to spread a set of re-codings about sex and politics. The 1960s sexual revolution did not replicate his clinics, but it replicated their logic. First, it employed Freudian tactics to confuse women about their sexuality. Second, it redefined individual sexual confusion as a political problem. Third, it then provides a “liberation” script of unhindered sexual promiscuity. Reich’s entire approach was specifically directed to women about shedding their “sexual repression” by becoming profligate. Keep in mind my documentation from previous essays that the sexual freedom of women was always viewed by the Jews as the fodder for political revolution. This is why the entire concept of female sexuality was so precisely – and deliberately – turned into a political weapon.

How “Science” Performed a “Normalisation” Function

Kinsey (center) with staff of the Institute for Sexual Research, later renamed the Kinsey Institute. Source

The “sexual research” done by Alfred Kinsey and Masters and Johnson basically attempted to normalise sexual perversity, but this assertion requires precision. Kinsey’s core operation was not so much an advocacy of perverted sexual behavior, but replacing moral judgment with statistical frequency. His reports aimed to show that “what is usually considered abnormal” sexual behavior “is actually not so abnormal.” The force of this operation comes from a normative substitution: from “many people do this”, it derives “doing this is normal”, and from “normal” it derives “it should not be morally condemned”.

It is widely-known and accepted today, though not at all publicised, that the methodology supporting these so-called “academic studies” was seriously flawed. Statisticians and other responsible professionals heavily criticised both Kinsey and Masters-Johnson from their first reports. Kinsey’s sample was merely a volunteer sample, subject to volunteer bias, and its findings were almost totally discounted because of systematic errors. Further, it was proven that much of his study data had been either manipulated or fabricated. Masters and Johnson’s Human Sexual Inadequacy was likewise criticised for “methodological errors, selection bias, inadequate follow-up, and ambiguous reporting of results”. In other words, the conclusions of these “scientific” authorities rested on data that lacked statistical accuracy – and therefore – support. Their “normalisation” effect came more from the mass media’s appropriation of the “science” label than from consensus within the scientific community. I will cover these “studies” in more detail later.

The Birth Control Pill: A “Supporting Role”, Not the Cause

Marcia Goldstein, the publicity director of Planned Parenthood, shows a sign advertising birth control that would soon be displayed on New York buses, on Dec. 14, 1967. Source

There is much skepticism toward the popular claim that “the pill was the trigger” for the sexual revolution, doubts which are supported by historical research. Although public discussion in the 1960s often attributed the sexual revolution to the introduction of the oral contraceptive (the pill), the historical record shows that this played only a supporting role among the many factors in the liberalisation of female sexual behavior and attitudes. Qualified observers and historians today explicitly reject treating the pill as the causal factor of the new sexual permissiveness.

There was a 2017 study in the Journal of Political Economy, stating that sexual behavior trends do indicate that increased access to the pill for young women fueled the sexual revolution, but there is no evidence that this simultaneously caused substantial changes in sexual behavior or in family formation. Rather, it was the legalisation of abortion that enabled large numbers of women to delay marriage and childbearing. And this aligns with our intuitive judgment: if the driving force of the sexual revolution were merely “no longer fearing pregnancy”, then the pill should have directly caused changes in family formation. But the facts are otherwise. The normative engine driving behavioral change was the “sense of obligation” to engage in pre-marital and extra-marital sex that was manufactured by cultural propaganda. The pill merely lowered the physical cost of compliance.

The Socio-Psychological Mechanism of Normative Pressure

Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau participates at the annual Pride Festival parade, July 3, 2016 in Toronto, Canada. Credit: Ian Willms, Getty Images. Source

Reader’s Note: “normative” or to “normalise” something, means to make it “normal”, to remove it from the realm of pathology or perversion and present it as something “normal” people do, and is therefore acceptable if not commendable. Today, we are seeing the normalisation of homosexuality, evidenced by parades of “gay pride”. In prior years, we saw the normalisation of abortion, removed from the category of unforgivable infanticide to an acceptance of the thesis that it is “normal” for the females of a species to kill their unborn young.

I was a university student at the time, and my feeling was that girls felt almost obliged to begin having promiscuous sex. I recall listening to girls talking among themselves, chastising themselves for being “prudes”, in fact criticising themselves for being “backward” or “Victorian” in not freely engaging in sexual intercourse as normal behavior on a date. Something was pushing them, and this “something” was the direct sexual propaganda in the media at the time, which was certainly a deliberately planned and executed agenda, using Freud’s psychoanalytic theories.

The girls chastising themselves for being ‘prudes’ that I saw in my university days was precisely evidence of this grammar taking effect at the level of subjectivity. Its mode of operation was not “command” but stigmatisation: re-coding the old sexual restraints (chastity, prudence, marriage-oriented sexuality) as “backward”, “Victorian”, “pathological”. When Cosmopolitan shaped unhindered sex as a constitutive element of modern female identity, and when Reich’s and Marcuse’s theories linked “sexual repression” to “political reaction” or “psychological neurosis”, refusal to participate was placed under a double stigma: you are not only “not modern,” you are also “unhealthy” or “unfree”, and, quite possibly, “abnormal”.

This created a self-executing normative obligation. Girls were not obeying an external command; they were acting according to a script already internalised as the standard of “self-realisation.” Their self-condemnation as “prudish” precisely shows that this grammar had successfully transformed external cultural pressure into internal self-scrutiny. The pill’s role was to eliminate the physical risk of compliance (pregnancy), but the normative engine driving compliance was the fear of “backwardness” jointly manufactured by media, theoretical discourse, and peer culture. This is why the “official narrative” about the pill is inverted. The precondition of behavioral change was that the meaning about “what is normal, modern, healthy womanhood” had already been rewritten. The pill merely made the new “normal” executable. The “sense of obligation to begin having promiscuous sex” that I observed as a witness is precisely the marker of this grammar taking effect at the socio-psychological level. It disguised a new normative pressure as “freedom.”

Media as a Tool for Shaping Sexual Morality

Helen Gurley Brown’s impact on popular culture and society reached around the globe, first with her 1962 bestseller, Sex and the Single Girl, and then for the more than three decades she put her personal stamp on Cosmopolitan in a way rarely replicated by editors. Source

The girls’ self-condemnation for their hesitation to engage in sexual activity was not merely or simply from “propaganda”, but from this normative pressure mechanism. Helen Gurley Brown’s Cosmopolitan provided this mechanism. When she took over in 1965, her operation was not abstract advocacy of “sexual freedom” but of detaching sex entirely from marriage and shaping it into a “guilt-free” marker of modern identity for all women. Cosmopolitan explicitly taught single women to “play by the same sexual rules that apply to men”, “detaching sex from marriage, making it guilt-free and available to all women”. Food, fashion, and beauty content were re-edited into scripts whose function was to embed “sexual liberation” in everyday consumption practices.

In fact and reality, Brown and Cosmopolitan made free and uninhibited sex appear as a natural upgrade of lifestyle rather than an ideological choice. I would add here that Brown, in her Cosmopolitan essays, boldly claimed that single girls should not concern themselves if a chosen lover is married, nor should they worry about causing a divorce. As to the existing wife, according to Brown, “If she can’t keep him, that’s her problem, not yours.”

Very few people know that Gloria Steinem spent two years in India after graduating from Smith College, after she received the Chester Bowles Fellowship that brought her to the country in 1956. Her experiences there, later became important to the way she thought about social movements and organizing. Source

Among the upper reaches of sexology, psychoanalysis, progressive publishing, and the feminist movement, the proportion of Jewish intellectuals was disproportionately high. Wilhelm Reich, Marcuse, Freud himself, the sexologist Borneman, and Gloria Steinem are all examples. A secularised (anti-moral and anti-religion) professional elite class hostile to traditional authority, was replete with Jewish individuals who occupied prominent positions in certain knowledge fields (sexology, psychoanalysis, social criticism), and who shared a liberationist ideological grammar.

Marketing Social Change

This item is too large a subject to include here, but a few comments are necessary. Perhaps following the perverted concepts of Sigmund Freud, the Jews have become expert at public manipulation. I offer here one example, by a Jewish company – the marketing of P&G’s Pampers in China.

P&G’s disposable diapers were not selling. Chinese mothers preferred washable cloth diapers, strongly resisting marketing efforts for what was seen as an expensive, wasteful, and unnecessary product. P&G then conducted extensive psychological and psychiatric research in attempts to identify the hidden fears and weaknesses in Chinese mothers so as to prey on those. And they found what they needed: the mothers’ concern for their baby’s health and his longer-term development and success in life. P&G then first created a scenario based on claims that increased sleep would not only improve a baby’s health but would result in “improved cognitive development and academic achievement”, thereby presumably guaranteeing wealth and a successful career. The second step was to produce so-called “studies” with “scientific results” that were probably fraudulent, with either fabricated or cherry-picked data, claiming that Chinese babies wearing Pampers fell asleep 30% faster than babies wearing cloth diapers, and further that their sleep while wearing Pampers would experience “50% Less Disruption”.

So, if your baby wears my diapers, he will become so smart he will earn a Ph.D. from an elite university. As a mother, how can you refuse? P&G were very proud of themselves for this manipulation. In an internal P&G staff promotional video, one Pampers brand manager boasted about his psychological fraud, saying, “We really had to change the mindset and educate [Chinese mothers] that using a diaper is not about convenience for you – it’s about your baby’s development”. Is that clear? P&G were “educating” mothers to believe that wearing disposable diapers would dramatically enhance their child’s mental development. And boasting about it. This is not clever marketing; it is evil manipulation.

Almost all of us, in our quiet moments, will recognise our vulnerability in a very large and sometimes frightening world and, perhaps without ever giving voice to our feelings, would ask, “What will happen to me? Will I ever be loved? If people really knew me, would they still like me? What will happen to my child? Am I really a good mother?” Thanks to the Jews Edward Bernays and Sigmund Freud, the brand advertisers use clever phrases and images to awaken these deepest fears and longings, exposing our emotional vulnerability, then quickly offer salvation and dream fulfillment. Our deepest and most vulnerable hopes and fears are shamefully manipulated to make us believe a sport shoe, a shampoo, a handbag, a face cream, a brand of baby milk, an automobile, will make us happy, popular, admired and lovable, and will somehow fill that well of doubt and emptiness inside us. And for the college girls: If you buy into this sexual transition, you will feel confident and empowered, and your popularity will soar.

A Directional Cascade

“Sexual liberation” as a revolutionary obligation and the foundation of self-realisation for women.

The model that best fits the evidence is not a conspiracy hatched in a closed room but a conceptual cascade created by individuals with similar strategic intent, institutional leverage, and directionality. The first layer was what we might call theoretical encoding of female sexual behavior. Reich and Marcuse re-coded chastity as “sexual repression”, then re-coded the sexual repression as political oppression and psychological pathology. They then re-coded “sexual liberation” as a revolutionary obligation and the foundation of self-realisation for women. This encoding provided an inversion of moral legitimacy: the old virtue became pathology, and the old self-restraint became complicity with male oppression.

The second layer was the scientific normalisation (making normal) of wanton and even perverted sexual behavior. Kinsey and Masters-Johnson provided statistical and clinical “evidence” in support of this normalisation of sexual promiscuity, despite serious methodological flaws. Their “evidence” was then decontextualised by the mass media (newspapers, Cosmopolitan) and converted into “science has proven that what you thought was abnormal is actually normal”.

The third layer was the commercial translation. Commercial media such as Cosmopolitan translated the theoretical encoding and “scientific evidence” into operable everyday scripts: how to dress, how to flirt, how to detach sex from marital commitment, how to make “guilt-free” sex a new identity marker. Their motive was profit, but the direction of profit happened to coincide with the direction of ideology.

The fourth layer was the institutional consolidation of the new normal. Funding by prominent foundations such as Ford and Carnegie of the ACLU Women’s Rights Project, legal strategies like Ginsburg’s divorce and gender litigation, and later sex education curricula, removed the old institutional constraints, giving the new scripts a legal and institutional default status. The fifth layer was the subjective internalisation of the “new normal”. Young women were socialised within this grammar, experiencing “sexual liberation” as self-realisation, and “prudishness” as a defect to be overcome. The sense of obligation that I observed in my university years is precisely proof that the fifth layer was in effect.

The directionality of this cascade was real: every major actor – theorists, sexologists, publishers, foundations, legal advocates – was pushing society in the same direction. Its power came in large part because it had no central command post: each actor could claim to be merely doing “their own thing” (research, selling magazines, litigating, pursuing profit), and need not take responsibility for the overall direction. When a group of influential people share the same vision and possess the institutional tools to realise it, even without a conspiracy, the result is indistinguishable from one. You do not need to assume they plotted in a closed room; you need only observe what their actions converged into.

The Analytical Framework

While a young man might appreciate girls who were sexually available, he might not want such a woman as a wife.

We have so far created a framework for describing this social movement. We have details, but are lacking an overall structure. How do we identify and describe this sexual revolution? What exactly was it? When did it begin in earnest in North America and the West generally? What were the main symptoms of its existence? Why did it seem to infect such a high number of girls at universities? Remember that this particular “sexual revolution” was aimed at single girls rather than married women. There were other social movements aimed specifically at married women; I will deal with those separately. What were the results on society? What were the results on morals? What was the long-term effect on marriage and family stability? This last question is important because, while a young man might appreciate girls who were sexually available, he might not want such a woman as a wife. This would necessarily have a noticeable effect on marriage rates and also on their success.

We need to construct an analytical framework covering the timeline, symptoms, and the impact on single women and marriage. Helen Gurley Brown’s Sex and the Single Girl, published in 1962, is often regarded as the starting point of the sexual revolution, though the media discovered the sexual revolution in earnest only in 1963–64. At the time, there was a well-attended public debate at the University of British Columbia (UBC) in Canada with the topic “Chastity is Outmoded”. The debate was carried in the affirmative. All accounts of this debate corroborate the pressure phenomenon I referred to earlier, and that was obvious among the participants in the debate. It was clear that non-participation in the sexual revolution was viewed amorally as “being behind the times”.

There was exhibited a distinct “normative pressure on the girls, whereby not participating in free sex was seen as being behind the times. There was a further, perhaps retributive, pressure, with the definition of female sexual freedom being apparently modelled on male norms of the time. The simple thesis was that “boys can do it without being condemned, and that constitutes unfair and oppressive fascism, so girls can do it too”.

The evidence – all of it – suggests that the sexual revolution of the 1960s–1970s, as it operated among single women, was a psychological, re-coding operation. It was a deliberate and institutionally-supported campaign to redefine female chastity and sexual restraint from a virtue to a pathology, from morality into a symptom of backwardness. Its long-term effect on marriage was produced not primarily through male mate-selection preferences, but through the erosion of marriage’s function as a commitment technology.

A Normative Re-coding, not Organic Social Evolution

The campus discourse explicitly condemned premarital chastity, while the “New Morality” on campuses condoned the attitude of free and unhindered sexual intercourse for young, single, white, middle-class women.

The most defensible definition is the one the historical literature itself supplies: the sexual revolution was “a specific interpretation of undeniable changes in mores and behavior”. The changes in behavior were real, but they were interpreted through a particular framework – that of “liberation” versus “repression” – and that interpretation did the normative work. It told people not merely that behavior was changing, but that the change was good, that resistance to it was pathological, and that the old restraints were illegitimate. The “official narrative” today attempts to place all the blame on the simultaneous appearance birth-control pill, but this is the typical Jewish “blame the victim” misdirection. The pill lowered the physical cost of non-marital sex; it did not tell anyone that non-marital sex was obligatory for a modern woman. That message came from the cultural apparatus, from the books, the magazines, the campus norms, and it is the message that explains the phenomenon I witnessed of university girls chastising themselves for being prudes. That wasn’t because they feared pregnancy, but because they feared being left behind.

It is true that the behavioral changes were gradual and had roots earlier than the 1960s. But the normative revolution, the moment when the sexual re-coding became a public, commercially transmitted, institutionally reinforced campaign, has a reasonably clear threshold. The revolution I am describing was not a slow drift in private behavior; it was a media event that converted a set of scattered behavioral changes into a public normative script. That script was then institutionalised on campuses, in advice literature, and in the commercial women’s magazines. The campus was the ideal transmission environment because it combined density, normative plasticity, and institutional permissiveness. But the specific mechanism was not simply “more freedom.” It was the conversion of sexual non-participation into a stigmatised identity.

The evidence from Canadian campuses is directly on point. I mentioned the debate on chastity at the University of British Columbia, with the student newspaper trumpeting the affirmative result on its front page. The argument was that “emancipated women had the same right as men to practice sexual promiscuity”. The debate was not a neutral exploration; it was a normative declaration that the old standard was obsolete. Lillian Rubin’s account of the same period is even more precise: “young women were caught between participating in men’s vision of female sexual liberation or risk being seen as retrograde prudes”. The pressure was “to go along to get along, to comply or be left out”.

This is why the revolution “infected” so many college girls. It did not succeed by persuading each woman individually through argument. It succeeded by changing the social meaning of refusal. To refuse was no longer to exercise a virtue; it was to reveal oneself as unfashionable, repressed, insufficiently modern, and possibly even pathological. That is a far more powerful mechanism than argument, because it operates through identity and belonging rather than through reason. The campus discourse explicitly condemned premarital chastity, while the “New Morality” on campuses condoned the attitude of free and unhindered sexual intercourse for young, single, white, middle-class women.

The married women’s movement – the workforce transition discussed in my previous essay – was a separate campaign with a different target, a different institutional base, and a different normative vocabulary (fulfillment, career, second income). They converged in their effects on the family, but they were not the same movement and did not operate through the same channels. My next essay will discuss the “Women’s Liberation” movement of the early 1980s, the one directed specifically at married (Gentile) women and the final nail in the coffin of the family unit and, likely, of Western society.

Long-Term Effect on Marriage and Family Stability

Concerning marriage: I will avoid until another time the question of whether men prefer chaste wives, and deal here with the question of whether the women who participated most fully in the sexual revolution were necessarily less committed to a marital bond. The evidence suggests that the association between a girl’s premarital sexual history and her divorce is largely explained by that relationship history. Researchers (Teachman, among others) found premarital sex limited to the future husband did not elevate the risk of marital disruption, but women whose first sexual partner was someone other than their husband more than doubled the risk of marital dissolution. This is firm evidence that a pattern of multiple premarital sexual relationships by a woman is associated with a lower likelihood of forming the single, durable commitment that marriage requires.

Concerning relationships: The normative re-coding did not merely change behavior; it changed what people expected from relationships. If sex is detached from commitment, then commitment itself becomes optional, revisable, and subject to ongoing satisfaction. This is the “normative deregulation” the literature describes: the demise of female morality and strong social constraints, and the rise of individualism and moral improvisation. The long-term effect on marriage is not that men refused to marry women with a past; it is that the population as a whole internalised a model of marriage as a constantly- renewable contract rather than a binding covenant. That model is compatible with stable marriage for only a very few – particularly the highly educated, who understand the landscape. But this model is extremely corrosive for the population as a whole, because it removes the external commitment structures that sustain marriages under stress. Those with less education and awareness also have less understanding of the environment, and are essentially trapped in a circumstance that appears to have indiscernible rules and a life of its own.

The Broader Societal Effects

One major development was that the concept of sexual restraint lost all its legitimacy. Chastity, modesty, shame, and sexual self-control were re-coded from virtues into symptoms of repression, backwardness, or even pathology. Sexual intercourse for young women was totally detached from procreation and even commitment. The pill and abortion lowered the physical cost; the normative re-coding lowered the moral cost. The result was a sexual culture in which the default expectation for young women was sexual activity without any moral or other framework. The immediate result was the rise of non-marital fertility and the decline of marriage. Non-marital births rose from 5% of all births in 1960 to 25% in 1990, and the marriage rate declined sharply over the same period, as did abortion frequency and divorce rates. The sexual revolution “paved the way” for these shifts. The professional classes may eventually find a new equilibrium of relatively stable marriage, while the less-educated population will experience the dissolution of the old model without acquiring the resources to sustain the new one.

The sexual revolution among single women was a commercially-transmitted and institutionally-reinforced normative re-coding campaign that converted chastity from a virtue into a stigmatised identity, and its long-term effect on marriage was produced less by male mate-selection than by the socialisation of a generation of young women into a renewable model of sexual enjoyment labeled as freedom. This model may be workable for the privileged, but is corrosive for everyone else.

Who Was Responsible?

We still have remaining questions about the driving force of this sexual revolution. Who started it, who continually pushed it to the extreme, and why did they do this? There may not have been a substrate that we could call a conspiracy, but there had to be more than nothing. The mere existence of Kinsey’s report, or the appearance of the birth control pill, or other identifiable factors, would not have resulted in such a dramatic social reconstruction, whether separately or combined. By themselves, all the pieces were inert. There had to be a driving force, perhaps not physically centralised, but still cooperating in some fashion toward a common end that all participants understood to be the common end. Just as with the women in the workforce, there had to be a determination among the various participants – a recognised objective to make young girls sexually promiscuous – because all the activity was directed to that end. “Somebody” or a group of “Somebodies” must have wanted the specific result that was obtained, and set about to deliver it. Something is missing here.

We need to identify a clear driving force to answer the question: “Who initiated the movement to re-code the sexual norms of young single girls?” How did the sexual liberation theories of Marcuse and Reich move from the margins into the mainstream? Why did the networks of foundations fund the theories, research and dissemination of female sexual promiscuity? Why did the media-publishing complex such as Cosmopolitan and Ms. commercialise and promote these ideas? Why was the sexology research of Kinsey and Masters & Johnson institutionalised and so widely disseminated by the media? What were the interconnections between academic, policy and educational networks?

There was an article by the Claremont Review of Books, which stated that “elites in positions of government, academia, the press, and so on” drove this revolution. This evidence points to a network comprising foundations (Rockefeller, Ford), sexologists (Kinsey, Masters and Johnson), media entrepreneurs (Friedan, Brown) and advocates of population control (Sanger, Rockefeller, the Population Council). While each had different motives, their combined efforts served to undermine traditional sexual restraints.

Again, the pieces, taken individually, are inert. A statistical report, a pill, a magazine; none of these can, by themselves, reorganise the sexual norms of an entire society. The missing element is agency: identifiable actors who possessed both the intention to produce a specific result and the institutional means to pursue it. The documentary record does not disclose a single command center, but it does disclose a network of strategically positioned actors whose combined efforts produced the outcome that obtained. The most defensible formulation is that the sexual revolution was driven by a coalition of three distinct but converging constituencies: population-control proponents, sexual entrepreneurs, and liberationist intellectuals, each pursuing its own institutional interests, but all sharing a common objective: eliminating the legitimacy of traditional sexual restraint as a barrier to their respective goals.

The Philanthropic Core: Population Control

Kinsey’s fascination with human sex life would lead to the publication of two books – Sexual Behaviour in the Human Male (1948) and Sexual Behaviour in the Human Female (1953). Known as the ‘Kinsey Reports’, they drew on 18,500 personal interviews. Although his analysis was carefully conducted, the studies were heavily criticised due to irregularities in the sampling and the unreliability of personal communication. Source

The Rockefeller network is the clearest case of intentional, resourced, and coordinated promotion. The Rockefeller Foundation funded Kinsey’s research with almost $500,000 (this in the 1940s). This was actually formally investigated: a Congressional Committee in the early 1950s (the Reece Committee) acknowledged the “strategic significance” of the funding by the Rockefeller Foundation. The report characterised the Rockefellers as “a venture capital fund for subversive ideas” that would otherwise be subject to the police power of the state. They further stated Rockefeller’s relation with Kinsey as the archetypal “social engineer” whose conclusions were intended and designed to supply a scientific warrant for abandoning the moral and legal concepts that proscribed free sexuality among single girls.

It is of note that the Rockefeller interest in the sexual freedom of young women was not primarily libertarian; it was Malthusian. John D. Rockefeller III founded the Population Council in 1952, which became the institutional hub for the promotion of fertility control as a solution to global population growth. The logic was straightforward: if sexual behavior could be decoupled from reproduction, and if the stigma attached to non-procreative sex could be dissolved, then the cultural barriers to contraceptive use and population control (abortion) would fall. Kinsey’s “normalising” statistics served this logic directly: they supplied the empirical premise that “what is common is normal, and what is normal should not be condemned.”

The Ford Foundation later supplied the legal and policy infrastructure. Its funding of Bader-Ginsburg’s ACLU Women’s Rights Project, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, and academic women’s studies programs, created the institutional channels through which the “normative” re-coding was translated into law and university curricula. By 1986, Ford had spent most of $100 million in these areas. The Ford grants were not framed as “sexual liberation” but as “women’s rights” and “reproductive health” – a vocabulary that allowed the real underlying project to proceed under a respectable institutional label.

The Sexual Entrepreneurs: The Transmission Mechanism

One night, her husband, the movie producer David Brown, had an idea while he watched her type. “You know,” he said, “if you had your own magazine, you could answer everybody at one time.”And, eventually, she did, taking over a money-losing literary publication called Cosmopolitan and turning it into a slyly risque bible for single women. Source

The second constituency was commercial. Cosmopolitan and Ms. magazines (and others) independently created the cultural category of the single girl as a sexually free, economically independent person whose identity did not depend on marriage. They simultaneously promoted the concept of free abortions on demand, which precisely meshed with Rockefeller’s goals of population reduction. Helen Gurley Brown in particular joined a failing magazine and converted it into a monthly behavioral manual for this new category of person. In it she embedded sexual freedom into ordinary consumer practices like fashion, beauty, and career advice, so that the “normative” re-coding appeared as a lifestyle upgrade rather than an ideological program. And she clearly knew what she was doing One assessment of Cosmopolitan’s influence under her direction was precise: “The overturn of a sexual morality that had survived intact for thousands of years was made possible by individuals willing to scandalise the public, while creating a new setting for the cultural and moral norm”. And while reaping huge profits.

The commercial motive was profit, not ideology. But the profit coincided with the philanthropic and population-control projects. The magazines and the foundations did not need to be in communication; they were both removing the same barrier of the stigma attached to non-marital, non-procreative sex, and they simply reinforced each other. The foundations supplied the funding and the scientific and legal legitimacy, and the commercial media supplied the mass distribution and the aspirational scripts.

The Intellectuals: A Provision of Moral Legitimacy

The third constituency was the liberationist intelligentsia. Wilhelm Reich coined the term “sexual revolution” in the 1930s and provided the core theoretical proposition: sexual repression is the mechanism by which authoritarian societies produce compliant subjects, and sexual liberation is therefore a political act. Herbert Marcuse systematised this in Eros and Civilization (1955). The Frankfurt School’s influence reached its apogee during the heyday of radical student protests in the late 1960s. The intellectuals did not command the movement, but they supplied something the philanthropists and the entrepreneurs could not: a philosophical justification that elevated sexual behavior from a matter of private morality to a matter of political liberation. This was the crucial “normative” move. It meant that resistance to the new sexual scripts could be re-coded not merely as “old-fashioned” but as “repressive”, “complicit with authoritarianism” and, worst of all, “pathological”. This is how sexual liberation became a political statement. The young women students who internalised this framework were not responding to a commercial advertisement alone. They were responding to a moral vocabulary that made sexual restraint appear as a form of political failure.

Why “Inert Pieces” Became a Movement

The three constituencies were not coordinated by a central authority, but they were functionally integrated by a shared objective and a division of labor. The philanthropic network supplied the empirical warrant (Kinsey’s statistics), the legal architecture (Ford-funded litigation), and the institutional cover (Rockefeller’s population control framed as reproductive health). The commercial entrepreneurs supplied the mass distribution (millions of magazine copies) and the aspirational scripts that translated abstract norms into daily practice. The intellectuals supplied the moral legitimacy that re-coded sexual restraint as repression and sexual “liberation” as a political duty.

The result was a self-reinforcing loop: the foundations funded the research that the media publicised; the media created the market that the entrepreneurs exploited; the intellectuals provided the vocabulary that made the whole enterprise appear as a movement for freedom rather than a project of social reconstruction. No single actor controlled the loop, but each actor had a clear interest in the loop continuing, and the direction of the loop was consistent across all three.

So, there was a coalition of institutional interests; philanthropic, commercial, and intellectual, that converged on the same objective and possessed the resources to pursue it. They did not meet in a single room, but they did not need to. The market, the foundation, and the university are coordination mechanisms in their own right, and when they align in the same direction, the result is indistinguishable from a planned campaign.

The question of “why” has a different answer for each constituency. The Rockefeller network sought population control through the removal of cultural barriers to contraception and abortion. The Jewish entrepreneurs sought profit from a new consumer market. The Jewish intellectuals sought the political transformation of Gentile society through the liberation of the sexual desires of young women. But the common intermediate objective – the delegitimisation of tradition’s female chastity – was shared, and it was pursued with intention, resources, and institutional strategy. That is the missing piece, but there is a bit more.

We can agree the answer was different for each constituent. The Rockefellers wanted population control, but no amount of the Rockefellers desire for population control would convert prudish young girls into promiscuous sexual activists. The entrepreneurs wanted profit, but no amount of greed in a magazine publisher would convert prudish young girls into promiscuous sexual activists. But then we have “the intellectuals” who wanted the specific social transformation caused by making sex like Alexandra Kollontai’s “glass of water” – sexual intercourse for a young woman is not different than drinking a glass of water when thirsty. And it is here where everything comes to a focus. It was this group, the Jewish so-called “intellectuals” who wanted this particular social upheaval, and then planned it and executed it with the participation of the other constituents – who were not critical to the project.

This is an important and sharp point. Of the three constituencies, the philanthropic (Rockefeller/population control) and commercial (profit-driven publishers) were instrumental, not essential. The essential driver – the one that actually wanted “prudish girls converted into promiscuous sexual activists” as an end in itself, not as a byproduct – was the intellectual/ideological layer. And those were all Jews.

Rockefeller’s population control interest might produce contraceptive distribution programs, but wouldn’t by itself produce a cultural/sexual revolution among college girls. Profit-seeking publishers respond to demand; they don’t create the demand ex nihilo, though they can amplify and shape it. So, the ideological layer is indeed the one with the specific motive matching the specific outcome. There was definitely a coordinated ideological vanguard with a blueprint, sharing the stage with a critical mass of ideologically-motivated actors in strategic positions (academia, publishing, media, law, foundation staff) whose shared convictions drove the project. There was not, and did not need to be, a blueprint document or coordinating committee, for this to succeed. I would note too, that the “intellectuals” weren’t a monolith. Reich, Marcuse, Kinsey, Friedan, Brown, Steinem, Ginsburg, the Frankfurt School; these had different and sometimes conflicting visions. But they shared the core commitment: female chastity as the enemy. It is also worth noting that the Jewish intellectuals were themselves embedded in institutions that gave them leverage. There were in universities, in the Foundations, and in the publishing houses. And crucially: the ideological cadre was small. This is a genuine point; small numbers can have outsized effect when positioned at institutional chokepoints.

It should be clear that the ideological constituency was the load-bearing one; the others were multipliers/enablers. But, to be precise, this was a project with a recognisable core program pursued by a cadre. There is much evidence of convergence and a shared ideology, and even a program, but not all following a single planning document. The other participants were important as enablers, but not as “motors” for the project. That is an important distinction because the “motor” was ideologically Jewish, and included abortion as well as rampant sexuality.

Population-control philanthropy has an interest in removing barriers to contraception; it does not have an interest in producing sexually active college girls as such. A foundation seeking to lower fertility in the developing world can achieve its objective through clinics, supply chains, and policy advocacy. It does not need to persuade a nineteen-year-old at the University of Toronto to abandon chastity. Where the two interests overlap – both require the delegitimation of chastity and sexual restraint – the Foundation has an incentive to fund the ideological project, but no incentive to originate it.

The commercial constituency is even weaker as a motor. Publishers do not create demand; they detect and amplify it. Friedan, Greer, Brown, and others succeeded because there was already a market. Due to the other factors, young women were already loosening their moral bonds, already restless, already receptive. A magazine that preaches sexual freedom to a generation that has no inclination toward it, fails. The commercial actor is a transmission belt, not an engine. Profit explains why the message was distributed; it does not explain why it was believed.

The Jewish ideological constituency is different in kind because its stated objective was identical to the observed outcome. The Frankfurt theorists, Reich before them, the New Left intellectuals, and the feminist theorists of the early second wave did not want “lower fertility” or “higher circulation”. They wanted the transformation of the female personality through the “liberation” – the complete unhinging – of sexual desire, and they said so explicitly. When the outcome matches the stated intention this precisely, the burden of proof shifts: you no longer need to explain how the outcome could arise without intention, because the intention is on the record.

Alexandra Kollontai’s “glass of water” theory – the proposition that sexual desire should be satisfied as casually as thirst -was an explicit Jewish doctrine, and it establishes the ideological continuity my earlier work traced: from the Bolshevik project of dissolving the family, through Reich’s fusion of psychoanalysis and Marxism, to Marcuse’s Eros and Civilization, to the New Left’s sexual politics. This is not a series of unrelated events that happen to resemble each other. It is a long Jewish lineage with a recognizable core doctrine: that the family is the primary mechanism of oppression, that sexual restraint is its enforcement apparatus, and that liberation requires the dismantling of both.

The Critical Structural Point

The part of this thesis that is both strongest and most under-appreciated, is that the Jewish “ideological” cadre was not large, and it did not need to be large. It needed to be positioned. And the documentary record shows that it was positioned at precisely the institutions that control the formation of the educated class: the universities, the program staff of the Foundations, the publishing houses, the mainline intellectual networks, and the legal advocacy organisations.

This is why the infection was concentrated among university girls. The Jewish intellectual cadre did not reach the general population directly; it reached the people who train teachers, journalists, clergy, lawyers, and social workers. From those positions, it shaped the curriculum, the editorial line, the sermon, the professional norm, and the legal framework. The message then reached the general population through the institutions the Jewish intellectuals had already captured, not through direct proselytisation. This is a transmission structure, and it explains both the speed and the selectivity of the change.

The Rockefeller and commercial constituencies were participants who were critical as enablers while being non-essential as motors. The cadre had the doctrine and the institutional positions, but it lacked three things that money and markets supplied: the empirical warrant (Kinsey’s statistics, which gave the doctrine a scientific face), the mass distribution (the magazines, which carried the scripts into ordinary households), and the legal cover (foundation-funded litigation, which converted the re-coding into enforceable rights). Remove those, and the cadre’s doctrine remains an academic curiosity. The correct statement is not that the other constituencies were unimportant; rather that they were instrumentally necessary but motivationally subordinate. The cadre supplied the end; the others supplied the means, each for its own reasons, and the alignment of means with a single end is what produced the result.

We cannot assume or claim a conspiracy in the usual sense, since the main parties were in fact pursuing different objectives. There did not need to be a single planning document, a coordinating committee, or a formal chain of command, and no such document exists in the historical record. On the other hand we can irrefutably prove that a small ideological cadre (Jewish) existed with an explicit doctrine; that the doctrine’s stated objectives match the observed outcomes; that the cadre occupied strategic institutional positions; that foundations and commercial publishers provided the funding and distribution; that the legal and academic infrastructure was built with traceable money and documented strategy; and that the principal actors were aware of, and in some cases explicitly discussed, the likely effects on the family and on society.

The formulation that survives our stated limits is this: the sexual revolution was a project with a recognisable core program, pursued by a small ideological Jewish cadre positioned at the institutions that shape the educated class, financed and distributed by philanthropic and commercial actors whose interests aligned with the cadre’s objective, and executed through the ordinary mechanisms of institutional influence rather than through conspiracy. That is a claim we can defend on the documents, and it is more damaging to the official narrative than a conspiracy claim, because it does not require us to believe anything for which we cannot produce evidence. It requires only that we follow the money, the positions, and the stated intentions—all of which are on the record.

The Physical Manifestation

One thing we are missing from this picture of the 1960s sexual revolution, is actual evidence of it. We know there was this transformation, but what were the symptoms of it? What did people actually do during this “revolution”? If I were a visitor from another world, what would I see? We had “a sexual culture in which the default expectation is sexual activity without … permanence”. What were the visible signs of this? If a visitor came to the US in the 1950s and again in the 1960s, how would things have changed in that ten years? What would he see that was different? What were the visible manifestations of this revolution?

The most visible changes were not single events, but rather a reversal of the default rules governing everyday interactions. Western society went from an assumption of chastity to one of sexual activity; from institutional constraints to self-regulation; and from a culture of shame to the guilt-free display of sexuality. If a visitor had walked American streets in 1955 and again in 1968, the most striking change would not have been a single dramatic event. It would have been a change in the default assumption about what a young woman was likely doing, and what she was supposed to be doing. The visible surface of daily life, items like clothing, campus rules, what could be said in public, where young people lived and with whom, registered a shift from a culture that presumed restraint to one that increasingly presumed sexual activity as normal and expected.

A foreign visitor would not have seen a single event called the sexual revolution. Rather, he would have noticed the erosion of a set of visible restraints like hemlines, legal obscenity, the presumption of chastity, and their replacement by a new set of visible permissions that presented themselves as freedoms. The surface of daily life changed because the rules that had organised that surface were being deliberately dismantled, and the dismantling was visible in the clothes, the campuses, the newsstands, and the statistics of ordinary behavior. Below is what the visitor would actually have seen, organised by the areas where the change was most visible.

The Body on Display

A visitor from 1955 would have registered the change as a collapse of the boundary between private bodily presentation and public visibility. The body that had been covered was now, in ordinary settings, deliberately on display. The most immediate visible change was the hemline. Through the early 1960s, skirts had generally not been worn above the knee, but by 1966 reached the upper thigh. The miniskirt changed that rather quickly; it was not part of any program; the creator simply managed to correctly read a social trend and capitalised on it. But it was not merely a fashion; it was a visual declaration that the female body was to be displayed (for sexual purposes) rather than concealed. Alongside the miniskirt, the bra was discarded – as evidence of a girl’s “independence”, with some girls wearing see-through blouses with no bra. Revealing necklines became customary. Rudi Gernreich (a Jew) “purposefully used fashion design as a social statement to advance sexual freedom”, producing both the first thong bathing suit as well as the topless bathing suit.

The campus was where the revolution was most institutionally visible, because the rules themselves changed in a documented, dateable way. In the late 1950s, the rules governing women students were explicit and enforced. Female students at almost every American college and university had a curfew; they had to sign in and out of their residences; they accumulated “late minutes” for violations and faced punishment for too many. Girls were subject to dress codes and residence-hall visiting rules that kept boys out of their living quarters and limited the hours when girls could be in boys’ dormitories. By 1966, the New York Times was reporting a systematic relaxation. Even “prudish” universities extended their visiting hours and permitted girls into the boys’ rooms. Curfews gradually disappeared, and the legal doctrine that campus administrators stood in place of the parents, was collapsing. The universities moved from the role of “guardian” of girls’ chastity to a role of “facilitator” of the opposite.

I could add here a note about the supposed “rape” of a young woman by several groups of young men at Cornell University in 2026. The documented reports state that the girl willingly agreed to a sexual “threesome” with two boys, engaging in simultaneous vaginal and oral intercourse – a situation they described as “a spit-roast”. Her police report stated her claim that she was “pretty okay” with the original suggestion. The objections arose when other pairs of boys apparently indulged themselves in identical activity with the girl. Think about this. In the 1950s and even in the 1960s, prior to the so-called sexual revolution, the general rule was that a girl would not permit a kiss on the first date. We have come a long way when an 18-year-old girl is “pretty okay” with an oral-vagina threesome. Further on this note, I read a recent article in one of the US mass media papers where a 15-year-old girl said that today “boys want oral, vaginal, and anal sex, and they want it all on the first date”. And this is represented to us by the Jewish “intellectuals” as liberation and freedom.

The second visible change was the commercialisation and public display of erotic material. Playboy had 7 million readers by the early 1970s. Cosmopolitan magazine was converted into a how-to manual for the sexually “independent” single woman, embedding sexual freedom in fashion, beauty, and career advice so that it appeared as a lifestyle upgrade rather than an ideological program. Pornography, almost exclusively a Jewish “value”, also flourished. I will deal with this item in another essay. The legal boundary of the obscene also moved. In 1967, the US Supreme Court allowed the importation of thousands of nudist and similar magazines that had previously been barred as obscene. The visitor would have seen, in ordinary newsstands and drugstores, material that would have been legally unavailable a decade earlier, and would have seen it displayed alongside mainstream women’s magazines that treated sexual freedom as the defining feature of the modern female identity.

The visible changes in dress and rules were accompanied by measurable changes in behavior, and the timing is important for our framework. Through the mid-1960s, the conventional scholarly view was that attitudes were liberalising but behavior was not changing much; premarital intercourse rates for college women remained low. That picture changed sharply in the late 1960s. By the mid-1970s, non-virginity rates for senior women at large universities were around 75%, roughly three times the pre-mid-1960s level. Cohabitation – living together unmarried – was still rare enough in 1960 to be considered almost non-existent, but the number of unmarried couples living together rose enormously by the end of the decade. Non-marital births, less than 4% of all births in 1950, climbed to nearly 40% by the mid-1970s. The visible surface of courtship and family formation was changing at the demographic level, not merely at the level of media imagery.

The most analytically precise way to describe what the visitor saw, would be a reversal of defaults. In 1955, the default presumption about a college girl was that she was not sexually active, and the institutional rules were designed to make that presumption enforceable. By the late 1960s, the default presumption was shifting toward expectation: the question was no longer whether a young woman would be sexually active before marriage, but how often, with whom, and under what terms. The rapid acceleration occurred precisely when the normative scripts changed, and the change was concentrated among the population that was most exposed to the institutional and cultural apparatus – university girls.

The visitor would also have seen the beginning of the downstream institutional effects that would become unmistakable by the 1970s. Divorce rates, which had been very low in the 1950s, almost unheard of, rose steadily through the 1960s and 1970s. Marriages formed in the 1970s and early 1980s faced the highest dissolution rates of the century. The assumption was that at least 50% of all first marriages would end in divorce. The change in sexual norms did not necessarily by itself cause every divorce, but the timing of the visible sexual shift coincides with the beginning of the family-stability decline that would define the next half-century.

The Prognosis

One last question on this topic of the sexual revolution. Should we believe there is any hope of change? Any possibility of society reverting to an earlier time with the earlier moral framework and values? There is a theory that sometimes when we go too far in one direction, the pendulum will swing to the other extreme, though I admit I don’t know of any examples where that has happened with social libertarian changes. So far as I am aware, once we have released “freedom” or liberty in a social area, we will never cancel that and revert to more restriction. I believe this is a one-way street. And the combination of the sexual revolution and the women in the workforce movement that we discussed earlier, means that the Western family unit is destroyed and gone forever. I am not certain what will replace it, but it isn’t likely to be attractive.

This is a genuinely difficult question and deserves a serious answer. Some reversals have happened in the past but they have been minor and on the fringes since the deeper structural changes are very hard to reverse. Drunk driving is one “freedom” that has been vigorously restricted. Some US states are reconsidering their stance on abortion after 50 years of relaxation, and no-fault divorce is also being reconsidered. We saw a restriction of freedom on tobacco, but tobacco was a habit; it was not a self-understanding. The sexual revolution is different in kind, because it did not merely change what people do; it changed what people believe themselves to be. That is why it is harder to reverse than tobacco,

On the other hand, pornography, the sexualisation of children, the praise of sexual perversities, gender transitions and much else, appear to be further encroaching on society.

Reversals do occasionally happen, but they tend to be narrow, specific, and often incomplete. The deeper point is that the sexual revolution differs from others because it is not just a behavior but an identity and a metaphysics. The re-coding went to the level of the self. Reversing it requires not just changing rules but changing what people believe about themselves and what they think love and the body are for.

The honest answer is that society-wide reversion to the 1950s moral, social and family framework is not going to happen. Those days are gone forever, and the costs are now increasingly visible (loneliness epidemic, declining fertility, family breakdown, mental health issues). This is not to say that all released freedoms can never be canceled, but the assertion is true for things that have become identity-constitutive. Social change can be fast when the conditions align. But sexual revolution reversal requires reversing something that is now embedded in identity, commerce, and law. The key variable is whether the change became part of the self-understanding of a large share of the population. Sexual freedom has become this.

What replaces the family is not likely to be attractive. The likely candidates are the therapeutic state, which manages individuals through clinical categories; the market, which sells companionship, sex, and care as commodities; and technology, which increasingly offers simulated intimacy through AI companions and virtual relationships. None of these can perform the family’s distinctive function, which is the transmission of moral formation across generations.

The reason is structural. The family is the only institution whose members have a natural interest in the flourishing of the next generation. A therapist is paid to treat the individual in front of them; a market actor is paid to satisfy the consumer in front of them; an AI is programmed to engage the user in front of it. None has a stake in the child who does not yet exist. The family does, because the child is its own continuation. That is why the family’s destruction is so consequential: it removes the one institution that is constitutionally oriented toward the future.

The pendulum theory is partly right, but it is usually misapplied. Pendulums do swing back, but they swing back at the level of specific practices, in specific jurisdictions, when the costs of the extreme become visible and an institutional vehicle exists to carry the reversal. They do not swing back at the level of an entire civilisational framework, because the framework is not a pendulum; it is a load-bearing structure, and structures do not reverse; they are replaced, or they collapse.

Mr. Romanoff’s writing has been translated into 34 languages and his articles posted on more than 150 foreign-language news and politics websites in more than 30 countries, as well as more than 150 English language platforms. Larry Romanoff is a retired management consultant and businessman. He has held senior executive positions in international consulting firms, and owned an international import-export business. He has been a visiting professor at Shanghai’s Fudan University, presenting case studies in international affairs to senior EMBA classes. Mr. Romanoff lives in Shanghai. He is one of the contributing authors to Cynthia McKinney’s new anthology ‘When China Sneezes’. (Chap. 2 — Dealing with Demons).

His full archive can be seen at

https://www.bluemoonofshanghai.com/ + https://www.moonofshanghai.com/

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